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ADAM M. SAMAHA
ENDORSEMENT RETIRES: FROM
RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS TO ANTI-
SORTING PRINCIPLES
Our constitutional law respecting religious establishments has
nearly nothing to do with the federal government. Putting aside
the best reading of constitutional text and constitutional law outside
the courts, the central government has little to fear from the Es-
tablishment Clause.' In fact, the Supreme Court has almost never
invalidated federal action on Establishment Clause grounds.2 Maybe
this is because national political institutions generate results that
are less often troubling to the Court, or because it holds such action
to a less demanding standard, or both. Regardless of the best ex-
planation, the law's bite is at the state and local levels.
Adam M. Samaha is Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
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The partial exception is Ti/ton v Richardson, 403 US 672 (1971), which largely upheld
a federal construction-grant program that included religious colleges, but which invalidated
and severed a provision that would have allowed non-secular use of the funded facilities
after twenty years. Aguilar v Felton, 473 US 402 (1985), which invalidated New York's
attempt to implement a federal special-education funding program, see id at 404-07, turned
on choices made by the locals and was overruled in Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203, 235
(1997).
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Knowing this helps account for an overlooked and yet revealing
quirk of the endorsement test for Establishment Clause violations:
the question is for judges, not juries.' The reason for this allocation
of power is not evident from the nature of the test. Roughly speak-
ing, the query is whether a reasonable observer would think that
the government sent a message favoring religion over non-religion.4
Context matters, including the community setting.5 Juries regularly
answer questions like this. Negligence cases call for somewhat sim-
ilar judgment.6 Even better, juries may determine whether speech
is so offensive to community standards that it qualifies as obscenity.7
There is a plausible reason why judges, particularly federal judges,
retain control over the endorsement question. Preventing govern-
ment endorsement of religion can be a shield for minorities within
a community against majority orthodoxy. The archetypical en-
dorsement problem is state-orchestrated prayer in public schools.
In this scenario, government is proselytizing. It becomes an instru-
ment for propagating mainstream religion, with dissidents either
persuaded, submissive, or publicly identified and exposed to ostra-
cism.8 Federal courts, which are theoretically more insulated from
ordinary political pressure, are then called on to comfort these
minorities. But on this account, impaneling a local jury drawn from
a fair cross-section of the community would be, to put it politely,
counterproductive. The endorsement test was written for and by
"outsiders."
The test does more than protect impressionable children, how-
ever, and powerful criticisms have been leveled at it. One is that
judges manipulate the test to reflect their own tastes for religion,
and in a way that provides insufficient warning of what will prompt
judicial rebuke. This objection might gain ammunition from the
' See Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J, concurring); Joki v Board
of Educ. of Schuylerville Cent. Sch. Dist., 745 F Supp 823, 829-30 (NDNY 1990).
4 Or vice versa. See generally Part II.A.
'See, e.g., Capitol Sq. Rev. & Advisory Bd. v Pinette, 515 US 753, 779-80 (1995)
(O'Connor, J, concurring) (likening the reasonable observer to the reasonable person in
tort law).
6 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 8, cmt b (Proposed
Final Draft, 2005).
' See, e.g., Jenkins v Georgia, 418 US 153, 157 (1974). One might guess that courts do
not trust the average non-judge to decide matters touching on religion. But jury partic-
ipation in employment-discrimination cases is to the contrary. See, e.g., Johnson v Spencer
Press of Maine, Inc., 364 F3d 368, 372-75 (lst Cir 2004).
8 See Abington Sch. Dist. v Schempp, 374 US 203, 224 (1963).
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split decisions in last Term's Ten Commandments cases.9 Much
doctrine is subject to similar assault, but the endorsement test is
especially vulnerable. It seems focused on relatively minor injuries,
like offensiveness to adult sensibility, and it is often difficult to
predict whether judicial intervention will cause more outrage than
it remedies. With the departure of Justice O'Connor-the author
and most committed supporter of the endorsement notion-there
is a good chance that the test will retire along with her. In fact,
because the test is so keyed to judicial perception, a change in
personnel almost necessarily changes the rule.
There is another perspective by which a version of the endorse-
ment test might be salvaged-an anti-sorting perspective. Religious
messages can be used not only to persuade or ostracize existing
community members, they can also signal the community's char-
acter to non-members. Depending on the preferences of these out-
siders, the message might be either enticing or repugnant. Hurt
feelings and inculcation are not the immediate problems, however.
The issue is government amplifying a cultural facet of the com-
munity and recipients of the message sorting themselves accord-
ingly.10 A political community's religious character and power struc-
ture are not transparent at a glance. Government-approved religious
symbols can speak to those matters, thereby helping to achieve a
preferred religious composition for the polity. And this is true even
if no one changes their religious identity or feels pressure to do so.
Proselytizing is not required to prompt sorting. Conceptually the
difference is between a sign inside the local schoolhouse reading
"Come to Jesus," and a sign at the town border reading, "Come to
Corpus Christi, Population 98% Christian."11 The first sign clearly
proselytizes but both could encourage sorting.
Government messages about religion might therefore be assessed
under two principles: anti-proselytism and anti-sorting. These prin-
ciples can coexist but they are not redundant. Government officials
could maximize religious homogeneity across political jurisdictions
'See McCreary County v ACLU of Ky., 125 S Ct 2722 (2005); Van Orden v Perry, 125
S Ct 2854 (2005); Parts I & II.A.
10 Compare Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J Pol Econ 416,
418 & n 12 (1956) (modeling local government competition for mobile citizens). I use
the terms "symbols" and "messages" interchangeably.
" See Part II.B. For use of signaling theory in support of anti-proselytism rather than
anti-sorting principles, see Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law,
79 Or L Rev 339, 383-89 (2000) (bolstering an anti-caste mission).
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without overtly proselytizing (e.g., by gerrymandering municipal
boundaries), and they might proselytize without prompting inter-
local sorting (e.g., by promoting monotheism through federal gov-
ernment mouthpieces). The implications of an anti-sorting prin-
ciple, moreover, stretch well beyond religious symbols. 12 First, an
anti-sorting perspective deepens our understanding of founding era
religious establishments. They might be better characterized as ef-
forts to sort rather than inculcate. Second, the principle can be
attached to the nationalizing spirit of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, along with subsequent judicial and theoretical suggestions
that religious faiths should not be divided by political boundaries.
Such division risks group polarization across jurisdictions, as well
as traditional non-establishment and free-exercise violations within
those jurisdictions. Third, an anti-sorting principle recommends a
slant in other constitutional doctrine drafted by courts. For example,
national standards for religious liberty would be better than local
political discretion and the resulting policy variance. In any case,
an anti-sorting principle is linked to deep questions about cultural
pluralism and government institutions. 3 Whatever are its imper-
fections, triviality is not one.
But any anti-sorting principle must meet a new set of challenges.' 4
12 See Part III.A.-B.
See generally Peter H. Schuck, Diversity in America: Keeping Government at a Safe
Distance (2003); Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Culturally Diverse So-
cieties: Issues, Contexts, Concepts, in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, eds, Citizenship in
Diverse Societies 1 (2000). Occasionally these discussions reach religion and the law lit-
erature-which has been heavy on political theory and selected precedent, but lighter on
history, sociology, and empirical knowledge. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religion, Race,
Segregation, and Districting: Comparing Kiryas Joel with Shaw/Miller, 26 Cumb L Rev 365
(1996); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term Forward: Nomos and Narrative,
97 Harv L Rev 4, 26-33 (1983); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of
Assimilation, 96 Colum L Rev 87 (1996) (hereafter Eisgruber, Assimilation); Christopher
L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Order, 89 Nw U L
Rev 347 (1995) (hereafter Eisgruber, Madison);Judith Lynn Failer, The Draw and Drawbacks
of Religious Enclaves in a Constitutional Democracy: Hasidic Public Schools in Kiryas Joel, 72
Ind L J 383 (1997); Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96
Colum L Rev 1 (1996); Sanford Levinson, On Political Boundary Lines, Multiculturalism,
and the Liberal State, 72 Ind L J 403 (1997); Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on Mul-
ticulturalism, "Equal Concern and Respect," and the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment, 27 U Richmond L Rev 989 (1993); Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the Village of Kiryas Joel,
96 Colum L Rev 104 (1996); see also Schuck, Diversity in America, ch 7; Richard C.
Schrager, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 Harv
L Rev 1810 (2004) (arguing that local-government action should be another factor in
Establishment Clause doctrine); Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion
Clauses, 90 Cornell L Rev 9, 89-90 (2004) (discussing religious instruction).
"4 See Part III.B.-C.
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One task is practical. The principle must be elaborated in a way
that is concrete, coherent, and administrable, especially if courts
will be involved. Options range from modest versions that prohibit
government action only if it purposely pushes citizens to separate
along political boundaries, to more assertive versions that inhibit
less intentional facilitation of religious sorting, or that demand af-
firmative government action to achieve religious "diversity." A pos-
sible legal analogue is racial segregation, but the constitutional ar-
guments play out differently with respect to religion. A related
problem for any anti-sorting principle is normative. A mixture of
religious views within each political jurisdiction is a contentious
mission. Local homogeneity can be a virtue, as Charles Tiebout
and his followers have tried to demonstrate. Religious symbols could
be roughly accurate representations of community character and
therefore helpful warnings or welcome signs. As well, much about
the sociology of religious sorting in America is unknown.
In some ways, the endorsement test is caught between a marginal
goal that produces as much animosity as reconciliation, and a mon-
umental goal that is encumbered with normative, positive, and prac-
tical difficulties. Not every relevant question can be answered here;
and I will conclude that current knowledge supports only a modest
anti-sorting principle that is judicially enforceable." This is nev-
ertheless an important supplement to present understandings of
constitutionally problematic religious establishments. Without pre-
empting the field, an anti-sorting perspective exposes unrecognized
features of old and new controversies, it fits with judicial skepticism
about local treatment of religion, and it gives reason to pay attention
to symbolic battles.16
I. DECALOGUES
Last Term, the Supreme Court decided two cases involving
Ten Commandments renderings. In a practical sense, however, a
third display was under consideration: the Court's own frieze of
lawgivers." One of them is located in the courtroom, above and to
5 See text accompanying notes 199-204, 252.
6 Religious sorting in state and local governments is the concern. I set aside religiously
homogenous electoral districts, which raise distinct issues. See Part III.B.1. Nor do I
discuss sorting across national boundaries.
" See Office of the Curator, Supreme Court of the United States, Information Sheet:
Courtroom Friezes: North and South Walls (2000), online at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
about/north&southwalls.pdf.
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the left of the bench from the Justices' perspective. In this rendering,
Moses is holding two tablets representing the Commandments. But
only the second half of the Decalogue is visible at all; that portion
is written in Hebrew and mostly obscured by Moses's body. He is
squeezed between Hammurabi and Solomon, not far from Menes
of Egypt and Lycurgus of Sparta-thus set within a line of a dozen
other figures, like a Metro car full of lawgivers at rush hour. What-
ever one's aesthetic tastes, the frieze is an impressive enough
achievement as a matter of craft, which should be no surprise. Its
specific content and shape were delegated to a skilled architectural
sculptor who was responsible for other pieces of national culture,
like the design of the dime. 8
Uncertainty surrounded the outcome of the two docketed cases,
but the Court's own use of religion-connected imagery was not at
risk. The aesthetic character of Washington, D.C., is a safe harbor.
Even Justice Brennan's dissent in Lynch v Donnelly 9-which op-
posed seasonal municipal displays of a Nativity scene accompanied
by less religious symbols-made an effort to preserve "In God We
Trust" on the national coinage and "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance.2 ° When a challenge to voluntary recitation of the Pledge
reached the Court, a majority dodged the merits on a novel standing
theory and the rest proclaimed their support for such nationalistic
references to monotheism.2 These messages are not inclusive
enough to reach several prominent religions in the United States,
and calling them "nondenominational" is a bit of unearned self-
congratulation. If there were 20 million Hindus and 20 million
Buddhists in this country the judiciary and Congress might think
differently.22 But maybe current practice is close enough for con-
" See Sydney P. Noe, The Medallic Work of A. A. Weinman, 7 Numismatic Notes &
Monographs 1, 8 (1921).
,9 465 US 668 (1984).
20 Id at 716-17 (Brennan, J, dissenting) (expressing uncertainty but offering arguments).
2, See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v Newdow, 124 S Ct 2301, 2305 (2004); id at 2316-20
(Rehnquist, CJ, concurring) (reaching the merits); id at 2323-27 (O'Connor, J, concurring)
(same, listing factors for a ceremonial-deism safe harbor); id at 2327, 2330 (Thomas, J,
concurring) (same, relying on a modest anti-coercion rule and resistance to incorporation).
22 See Ariela Keysar, Barry A. Kosmin, and Egon Mayer, American Religious Identification
Survey 6, 13 (2001) (hereafter ARIS Survey) (reporting results of a national telephone
survey of 50,000 adults and estimating that, in 2001, there were 1,182,000 self-identified
Buddhists and 766,000 Hindus-numbers more than double the results in a similar 1990
study); see also Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, The Churching of America, 1776-2005:
Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy 241 (2d ed 2005) (reporting larger numbers).
[2005
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stitutional work, and in any event the ceremonial deism that Wash-
ington ordinarily produces is protected from judicial interference.
The two cases on the docket presented questions about state and
local displays. The state-sanctioned display was, almost literally, a
fifty-year-old version of the Commandments. Among English-
speaking adherents to the Hebrew Bible, there is no "the" Ten
Commandments. Different Bibles differently translate the Book of
Exodus from Hebrew to English. Some of the differences are or-
ganizational or structural (like numbering and therefore grouping);
others are textual. One potentially important choice is between an
injunction against "kill[ing]" or "murder [ing]. '23 Those who created
the monument at issue in Van Orden v Pery 2 4 understood this.
Ultimately working with a private civic association, a committee
representing Protestants, Catholics, and Jews selected the wording
for a Ten Commandments monument.25 It is not a transcription
from any Bible of which I am aware. The structure looks Lutheran
while the text seems to be an excerpt from the Protestant King
James version.26 Perhaps hundreds of such monuments were dis-
tributed throughout the country, at least ostensibly in an effort to
reduce juvenile delinquency.27 One six-foot-high monument ended
up on the capitol grounds in Austin, Texas:
I AM the LORD thy God.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images.
Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain.
Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long
upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
23 Compare The Holy Bible: Authorized King James Version 72 (World Publishing Co.,
1972) ("Thou shalt not kill.") and The Holy Bible: Confraternity-Douay Version 98 (Catholic
Book Publishing Co., 1961) ("You shall not kill."), with Tanakh: The Holy Scriptures 116
(Jewish Publication Soc., 1985) ("You shall not murder.") and The Access Bible: New Revised
Standard Version 96 (Oxford, 1999) (same); id at 96 n c ("Or kill"). An accessible discussion
that emphasizes the textual and possible substantive differences is Paul Finkelman, The
Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and Elsewhere, 73 Fordham L Rev 1477 (2005).
24 125 S Ct 2854 (2005).
25 See Books v City of Elkhart, 235 F3d 292, 294 (7th Cir 2000).
26 See Finkelman, 73 Fordham L Rev at 1492 (cited in note 23).
27 See Van Orden, 125 S Ct at 2878 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
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Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant,
nor his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy
neighbor's.
PRESENTED TO THE PEOPLE AND YOUTH OF TEXAS
BY THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES OF TEXAS 196128
If one takes the capitol grounds as the frame, the Eagle's monument
is not alone. It was placed among several others dedicated to his-
torical events and good deeds of factions within the state.29 In a
sense, the Texas display is more reflective of private social move-
ments, but its surroundings have an ecumenical quality similar to
the Court's frieze.
The county-level display in McCreary County v ACLU of Ken-
tucky3" was the least cosmopolitan of the three. The Ten Com-
mandments element consisted of a framed sheet of paper. It was
surrounded by other documents, such as the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, which have at best a tangential historical relationship to
the Decalogue. County officials chose to transcribe in more detail
the King James version from its Book of Exodus and, unlike the
Texas monument, the document was so labeled.3" As such the re-
mainder of the text and structure was similar to the Eagles's choices
forty years earlier yet distinct.32 The warning about graven images
was reprinted in full, closing with a penalty clause: "for I the LORD
thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon
the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate
me." Taking the Lord's name in vain was supplemented with a
second caution: "for the LORD will not hold him guiltless that
taketh his name in vain." And the final clauses on coveting are
grouped together, altering the implied numbering of the Com-
mandments.33 No outside organization appears to have motivated
the display, although a county resolution indicates officials wanted
See id at 2873-74, 2891.
29 See id at 2858 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, CJ).
30 125 S Ct 2722 (2005). In the text, I am referring to the third and final version.
3 See id at 2730.
32 See id at 2730-31; Letter from Nancy Rankin, ACLU of Ky, to Adam Samaha,
University of Chicago Law School 2 (Oct 24, 2005) (on file with the author) (reproducing
the display).
" McCreary's document also referred to coveting "ox" and "ass" rather than "cattle."
[2005
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to show support for Roy Moore,34 and the county was working
around federal court supervision.35 Residents took up a collection
for litigation expenses.3 6 So the local version was more home-grown,
sectarian, and contemporary than its state and national counterparts.
Perhaps the results should have been predicted. The Court per-
mitted the state's display and prohibited the county's. The former
was closer to the frieze and the Pledge. Although the Court was
divided and relied on the county's alleged purpose of endorsing
religion,37 the differences in content among the displays are notable.
Not every locality would produce a display like McCreary's, of
course. One would expect Chicago's population and politics to differ
from those of Kentucky coal country. The point is that decentral-
izing religious symbolism produces messages often different from
comparable national efforts, and with meaningful variance among
localities. Judged by self-identification, no religion exceeds 25 per-
cent of the national population;38 but localizing decisions changes
the mixture of religious values.
II. MISSIONS
The question is whether anyone, especially courts, should
care about the way government is decorated. The textual hooks are
of course the First and Fourteenth Amendments.39 But conventional
sources of interpretation leave important questions open. So courts
select particular problems for attention, which begs the question
about religious symbolism cases. Nobody is losing the right to vote,
or speak, or receive tangible government benefits; nobody is for-
mally compelled to attend or not attend religious ceremonies; no-
body is taxed to pay for substantial material benefits to religious
causes. And yet Supreme Court majorities have supported an en-
"4 See McCreary, 125 S Ct at 2729. Moore ultimately lost his well-publicized effort to
maintain a Ten Commandments monument at the Alabama State Judicial Building. See,
e.g., Glassroth v Moore, 335 F3d 1282 (11th Cir), cert denied, 540 US 1000 (2003).
"s See, e.g., ACLUof Ky. v Pulaski County, 96 F Supp 2d 691, 702 (ED Ky 2000).
36 See Letter from Jimmie W Greene, McCreary County, to Adam Samaha, University
of Chicago Law School 1 (Oct 21, 2005) (on file with the author) (recollecting that little
money was collected in the defense fund and that the money was spent on radio and
newspaper advertisements).
31 See text accompanying note 74.
See ARIS Survey at 12-13 (cited in note 22).
3 See Everson v Board of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 US 1, 14-15 (1947).
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dorsement test that sometimes prohibits government affiliation with
religious messages.
This section offers two possible justifications. The first is con-
ventional wisdom: courts are enforcing a principle against state
proselytizing, which attends to direct psychic and cultural impact
within a static community membership. On its own, that principle
probably cannot sustain the endorsement test in its current form.
The second justification has not been noticed but its objective is
far from trivial. It can be expressed as an anti-sorting principle,
which is generally opposed to religiously monolithic localities. As
applied to religious symbols, the concern is people judging the
religious character of a community and then sorting themselves
accordingly. Unlike anti-proselytism, an anti-sorting principle may
apply even if nobody is offended, convinced, or ostracized.
A. ORTHODOXY: GOVERNMENT PROSELYTIZING
In 1984, Justice O'Connor suggested a refashioning of Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine around the idea of non-endorsement.
Attempting to capture the essence of the clause, she asserted that
government must not act with the purpose or effect of endorsing
religion over non-religion, or one religion over another.4° More
generally, religion should not be relevant to anyone's "standing in
the political community."'4' "In" has unappreciated significance. It
indicates that the test targets localities that treat some of their
current members as if they were outsiders. Prohibited endorse-
ment informs religious nonadherents that they are "outsiders, not
full members of the political community," and it conveys to ad-
herents that they are "insiders, favored members of the political
community. "42
The endorsement test became popular with some, but it failed
to unify the field. Justices most skeptical of government benefits
flowing to religion embraced the test, sometimes forging major-
40 See Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 688, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J, concurring) (stating
that government may not disapprove of religion, either); cf. Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US
602, 612-13 (1970) (referring to secular purpose, religious effect, and excessive
entanglement).
4' Lynch, 465 US at 687 (O'Connor, J, concurring).
412 Id at 688 ("Disapproval sends the opposite message.").
[2005
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ities.43 In addition, some commentators were excited. A strong
form of the test fit with certain "neutrality" theories of the religion
clauses,' and some scholars saw an opportunity to merge race
issues under the Equal Protection Clause.4" But the test never
fulfilled these hopes. Endorsement did not become the sole touch-
stone for Establishment Clause claims; the Supreme Court did
not adopt neutrality toward religion as a guiding principle in any
strong form;46 and unsuccessful challenges to displays of the Con-
federate battle flag47 suggested the idea of non-endorsement might
be an orphan in constitutional law.
Moreover, the endorsement test prompts strange questions. It
might make a difference whether the government mails checks to
religious organizations according to the number of people they
serve, or instead sends the checks to individuals who will then
sign them over to those same organizations.48 Such inquiries seem
unhelpful at best. It might be important that individual benefi-
ciaries choose whether their religious service providers receive
state funding, but that does not depend on the immediate recipient
of the funds. And it is hard to see the good use for such perception-
" See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v Doe, 530 US 290, 308 (2000) (addressing a system
facilitating prayer before high school football games); County of Allegheny v ACLU Greater
Pittsburgh Ch., 492 US 573, 593 (1989) (addressing a Nativity scene in a county
courthouse).
4 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious
Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 Harv L Rev 155, 177, 223 (2004);
Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Toward Religion Under the Establishment
Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Thought, 64 NC L Rev 1049, 1055-59,
1069 (1986).
" See Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of
Government, 27 Harv CR-CL L Rev 503, 512-25 (1992).
46 See, e.g., Zelman v Simmons-Harris, 536 US 639 (2002); Mitchell v Helms, 530 US 793
(2000). In fact, Justice O'Connor initially promoted her test as a way to preserve some
state action benefiting religion, such as exemptions from secular regulation and mere
"acknowledgment" of American religious heritage. See Lynch, 465 US at 691-93
(O'Connor, J, concurring).
41 See Coleman v Miller, 117 F3d 527, 530-31 (11 th Cir 1997) (per curiam), cert denied,
523 US 1011 (1998); NAACP v Hunt, 891 F2d 1555, 1565 (lith Cir 1990) ("The federal
judiciary is not empowered to make decisions based on social sensitivity."); Mississippi Div.
of United Sons of Confederate Veterans v Mississippi State Conf. of NAACP Branches, 774 So2d
388, 389-90 (Miss 2000); Daniels v Harrison County Bd. of Supervisors, 722 So2d 136, 137
(Miss 1998); cf. Briggs v Mississippi, 331 F3d 499, 502, 508 (5th Cir 2003) (rejecting an
Establishment Clause attack on the St. Andrews-cross-like element of the Confederate
battle flag, which is incorporated into the Mississippi state flag), cert denied, 540 US 1108
(2004).
" See Mitchell, 530 US at 842-43 (O'Connor, J, concurring) (referring to public
perceptions).
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centered questions in adjudicating emerging controversies, like
exemptions from conditions on government subsidies for religious
recipients. Before she retired, Justice O'Connor herself openly
doubted that the Establishment Clause could be sensibly imple-
mented in one test.
49
Non-endorsement is now restricted in scope but it remains vital
in the government-speech context.5° One reason is heritage. It is
an extension of the school prayer cases decided in the 1960s."'
They dealt with government officials delivering religious messages
to children in public schools, which were provided at no extra
charge to parents who were legally obligated to educate their chil-
dren somewhere. The exact effect of these religious exercises is
not really known. Some children surely accepted the content al-
ready, or were deaf to it; others might have been inculcated, or
identified themselves as dissenters by not participating.52 In any
case, the Court held government proselytizing intolerable in this
setting-even if students were formally permitted to opt out.53
Although the Court sought to prohibit more than conventional
coercion, 54 there was unmistakable attention to circumstances of
persuasion. The gist of the endorsement test in its present form
is not far removed from anti-proselytism. It is supposed to shield
community members from government-backed messages that
make them feel like outsiders. 55
49 See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Scb. Dist. v Grumet, 512 US 722, 718-21 (1994)
(O'Connor, J, concurring).
o See id at 720 (suggesting this application).
"' The word was even used. See Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421, 436 (1962) (acknowledging
that the "governmental endorsement" of a prayer might seem insignificant); Abington Sch.
Dist. v Schempp, 374 US 203, 257 n 23 (1963) (Brennan, J, concurring), quoting Letter
of Dec 7, 1871, to Rev D. McAlister, in Charles Bradley, ed, Miscellaneous Writings of the
Late Hon. Joseph P Bradley 357-58 (1901) ("The Constitution was evidently framed and
adopted . . . to avoid all appearance even of a State religion, or a State endorsement of
any particular creed or religious sect."); see also, e.g., Lowe v City of Eugene, 463 P2d 360,
363 (Or 1969) (addressing a publicly displayed religious symbol), cert denied, 397 US
1042 (1970).
52 See Schempp, 374 US at 205-12 (noting opt-out rights and describing trial testimony).
s Contrast West Va. Bd. of Educ. v Barnette, 319 US 624, 642 (1943), which thundered,
"no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion," yet allowed flag-salute ceremonies to go on with
formal opt-out rights.
14 See Schenopp, 374 US at 223; Engel, 370 US at 431; accord Lee v Weisman, 505 US
577, 587 (1992).
" See Wallace vJaffree, 472 US 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J, concurring) (worrying about
pressure on non-adherents and quoting Engel, 370 US at 431).
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Criticism of the test has not been so much about its origins as
its alleged extravagance and self-reference.56 Judicial proponents
of the test seem fixated on stand-alone psychological injuries that
might not be judicially cognizable in other fields of constitutional
law.57 There is a long distance between feelings of alienation pro-
duced by government symbols and those produced by more severe
manifestations of second-class citizenship, such as the inability to
receive cash benefits, to vote, or to hold office. This is not to
dismiss emotional injury as beneath concern.5" The doctrine,
moreover, might be defended as prophylactic. Perhaps fearing ma-
nipulation of religious culture by the state, courts intervene at the
threat's outer boundaries. But the intervention is not cost-free.
Soothing secular and religious minorities in this way can incite
the hostility of local majorities. Even if locals are not apoplectic
about having to modify a religious display (the stakes might be
judged equally low for supporters of these messages), national
interest groups are sometimes happy to bear litigation costs. In
fact, these groups might gain by losing on the merits.59 And at least
equally important problems-public symbols associated with rac-
ism-were left unaddressed.6"
Furthermore, a test that is too restrictive will prevent real gains
56 Especially helpful critiques are Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and
Desirability, 18 J L & Pol 499 (2002), and Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and
Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 Mich L Rev
266 (1987).
" See Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 755 (1984) (recognizing racial stigma as a cognizable
injury if the litigant was personally denied equal treatment); cf. United States v Hays, 515
US 737, 744-45 (1995) (denying standing to non-residents of a congressional district
allegedly gerrymandered by race, yet indicating residents have standing because of the
risks of representational harm).
" Converting emotional harm into a damages figure is challenging but this does not
mean there is no harm. Nor are religious symbolism cases get-rich-quick schemes. Damages
are rarely at issue.
'9 Compare Alan Cooperman, Christian Groups Plan More Monuments, Washington Post
(June 28, 2005) A6 (reporting that both sides "said the displays are now the frontline of
a proxy war, standing in for the bigger issue of the place of religion in public life").
" Compare Jesse H. Choper, Securing Religious Liberty: Principles forludicial Interpretation
of the Religion Clauses 101-02 (1996) (arguing that racially stigmatizing messages are the
greater concern). But cf. Virginia v Black, 538 US 343, 361-63 (2003) (permitting states
to punish cross burning with intent to intimidate, given certain safeguards). For a nuanced
account of Confederate monuments, see Sanford Levinson, Written in Stone: Public Mon-
uments in Changing Societies 76-77, 104-10 (1998) (indicating some government use of
religious symbols should be judicially policed, but not existing Confederate battle flags).
For other views on flags, see Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 Howard LJ 121 (2004), and James
Foreman, Jr., Note, Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate Flag from Southern State
Capitols, 101 Yale LJ 505 (1991).
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toward secular goals. Cobb County, Georgia's, stickers for biology
textbooks ("Evolution is a theory, not a fact . . . .") were crudely
phrased, but they were apparently bundled with the decision to
make instruction on evolution mandatory instead of optional.6 If
religious opposition to such instruction was widespread and if the
participants were acting in good faith, it might have made sense
to exchange a sign of respect for a broader education in mainstream
science. Probably no other scientific theory is so accepted within
the discipline and so openly doubted in public opinion.62 Com-
promise on educational method is a delicate matter, but a judicial
bar on negotiation might hinder a comprehensive science curric-
ulum.6 3
Then there are issues of vagueness and perspective. Constitu-
tional violations based on religious offense to any one observer
would multiply beyond control, so a "reasonable" observer's per-
spective was adopted.64 This led to debate about the characteristics
of the construct.6" Perhaps not surprisingly, Justice O'Connor's
reasonable observer came to look more and more like the judge
who was operating the test: striving for some kind of objectivity,
familiar with the history and context of the state action at issue,
perhaps misperceiving the government's intended message.66
6 See Selman v Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F Supp 2d 1286, 1289-97, 1313 (ND Ga
2005) (enjoining use of the stickers). The full text of the sticker is, "This textbook contains
material on evolution[.] Evolution is a theory, not a fact, regarding the origin of living
things[.] This material should be approached with an open mind, studied carefully, and
critically considered." Id at *5. Evolution is a theory (regarding species diversity)-but so
is gravity, and thus the issue is the district's decision to single out evolution in this way.
6 See, e.g., Lisa Anderson, Museums Take Up Evolution Challenge, Chi Trib (Oct 16,
2005) (reporting results of a 2005 Gallup Poll in which 53 percent of respondents indicated
a belief that "God created humans in their present form exactly the way the Bible describes
it," 31 percent indicated that God guided a process whereby humans evolved over millions
of years from other life forms, and 12 percent indicated that humans evolved but God
played no part in the process).
63 See also Tracey Meares and Kelsi Brown Corkran, When 2 or 3 Come Together, Uni-
versity of Chicago Public Law Working Paper No. 107 (Oct 2005) (discussing police use
of a religious message to help organize church leaders).
64 See, e.g., McCreary County v ACLU of Ky., 125 S Ct 2722, 2737 (2005); Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v Newdow, 124 S Ct 2301, 2321 (2004) (O'Connor, J, concurring); see
also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v Doe, 530 US 290, 308 (2000) (assuming the perspective
of an objective high school student at a football game).
6 Compare Capitol Sq. Rev. & Advisory Bd. v Pinette, 515 US 753, 780-82 (1995)
(O'Connor, J, concurring) (assuming more knowledge), with id at 807-08 & n 14 (Stevens,
J, dissenting) (assuming less knowledge).
66 See id at 776-77, 780-82 (O'Connor, J, concurring) (intimating that the reasonable
observer can be reasonably confused); Wallace vjaffree, 472 US 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor,
J, concurring).
[2005
HeinOnline  -- 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 148 2005
ENDORSEMENT RETIRES 149
Some of these problems are reparable matters of detail, but the
endorsement test is problematic even for those committed to an
anti-proselytism principle.
All of which leaves endorsement in a precarious state. In last
Term's cases, the fissures were obvious. Although the Court is
essentially unanimous on some kind of anti-proselytism princi-
ple,67 several Justices oppose the non-endorsement concept as too
stringent, while the test's adherents disagree on its precise content.
Thus the Texas monument was left standing by a plurality basically
unconcerned with "passive" and non-"coercive" displays of mon-
otheism,68 plus Justice Breyer, whose pragmatism counseled
against sending forklifts to remove this and perhaps hundreds of
other decades-old monuments.69 His opinion was overtly anti-
doctrine, claiming to find no guidance in tests and instead pointing
to vague principles and a bundle of facts.7" For example, taking
the capitol grounds as the denominator and considering the civic
and ecumenical features of the donor, one might see a reflection
of several influential components of state heritage without an ob-
trusive effort to promote religious faith per se. The case did in-
volve government's connection to religious symbols, but not a very
effective form of proselytism.
McCreary County's conduct was judged differently. Justice
Breyer seemed to revert to a presumption against government
attachment to religious content,71 and he must have guessed that
in this instance judicial intervention was worth the resulting local
friction. A municipality was changing the aesthetic status quo,
67Justice Kennedy has written that the government should not proselytize and that a
Latin cross on the top of city hall would be unconstitutional. See County of Allegheny v
ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Ch., 492 US 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J, concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia's dissent in McCreary County suggests that government
cannot take official positions on live controversies over religious doctrine, see 125 S Ct
at 2762 n 12-which presumably would foreclose a national Book of Common Prayer or
an official translation of the Hebrew Bible. Justice Thomas is a partial exception because
he would not apply Establishment Clause norms to the states, see, e.g., Newdow, 124 S
Ct at 2328 (Thomas, J, concurring), but he would so apply anti-coercion norms from the
Free Exercise Clause, see id at 2330, 2333 n 5.
68 See Van Orden, 125 S Ct at 2861 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, CJ).
69 Compare id at 2870 (Breyer, J, concurring) (stressing the absence of strife surrounding
the monument until this suit, and lack of evidence that the placidity was due to oppression).
70 See id at 2871.
7 He joined Justice Souter's majority opinion. To confirm a strong preference for only
secular government symbols, we would need to know whether Justice Breyer would in-
validate a municipal choice to remove a religious symbol from government property despite
risks of strife.
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partial to the King James Decalogue, and associating itself with
Roy Moore's challenge to federal authority. A majority was
achieved with three other Justices who strongly prefer government
abstention from religious messages, and Justice O'Connor, who
connected the issue to freedom of conscience72 and therefore pros-
elytism. Distinguishing the county's final display from the Texas
version was tricky, though. Its Decalogue was joined with several
documents lacking religious content.7 3 So the majority concen-
trated on the legislative and litigation history, condemning what
it took to be the county's purpose of highlighting religious mes-
sages.74 This strategy is telling, and not only because this purpose
suggests a future threat of proselytizing. It indicates concern with
how municipalities operate, not just how they look.
But appearances do matter for endorsement purposes and many
observers cannot identify a sufficiently important mission for the
test. It is a step removed from government proselytizing. It comes
with the risk of populist backlash. And it seems to incorporate a
self-referential and D.C.-centric religious aesthetic that is foreign
to many localities.
B. REFORMULATION: RELIGIOUS SORTING
There might be another way to justify something like a non-
endorsement rule, but it requires a departure from the anti-pros-
elytism perspective. Instead, an anti-sorting principle would ani-
mate judicial intervention and oppose the coincidence of political
and religious boundaries. There is a connection between anti-
sorting and anti-proselytism principles, which will be apparent in
the discussion below. For instance, a public school district's de-
cision to promote a literal reading of the Book of Genesis as
contradicting and superior to any scientific theory of evolution
would be a basis for sorting into and out of that jurisdiction. Anti-
proselytism and anti-sorting have different legal implications,
however, and they require different justifications.7" But for all its
problems-and they are serious-an anti-sorting principle extends
7 See McCreary County, 125 S Ct at 2746 (O'Connor, J, concurring).
71 See id at 2731 (opinion of the Court).
71 See id at 2737-41 (noting one display that posted a version of the Decalogue essentially
alone and a second that added other texts but emphasized their religious content).
71 See Part III.A.-B.
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the mission of non-endorsement beyond prevention of offense.
To get the gist of how interlocal sorting might work, Charles
Tiebout's well-known model is a good place to start. Different
people have different preferences for government services and tax-
ation, as well as matters of lifestyle. If we permit state and local
governments to offer different policy packages, and if we permit
mobile citizens to select among these governments, then (given
some additional assumptions) government offerings will better
match preset citizen preferences and implementation of these pol-
icies should be easier. Voting and other forms of voice might be
far less significant than the dynamic created by citizens with an
exit option. In fact, a big selling point for the model was that,
through migration, citizen preferences for public goods would be
credibly revealed to government officials.76
But the model then adds a strong assumption about the knowl-
edge of citizens. It assumes consumer-voters have perfect infor-
mation about the available policy packages.77 Certain municipal
features, like property taxes or road conditions, are easy to ascer-
tain. Others'are not. How people interact, their preferences be-
yond policy, the set of informal associations, the social hierarchy,
the political power structure, and other elements of "community
character" are difficult to grasp at a glance-at least in the absence
of an effort by insiders to signal outsiders. Whether deciding on
where to reside, recreate, retire, or work, outsiders will often care
about these intangible features of a community.
A community's religious character may fall into the second cat-
egory. Unlike race,78 one's religion is not necessarily a visible fea-
ture. Looking at people is a low-probability tool for an outsider
seeking knowledge about neighborhood religion. And reliable de-
mographic data on religion are surprisingly difficult to obtain.
Again unlike race, for which statistics are available decennially at
the micro-levels of census tract and block,79 religious-affiliation
data are no longer collected by the federal government.8" County-
76 See Tiebout, 64J Pol Econ at 418-19 (cited in note 10).
See id at 419 (assumption 2 regarding "full knowledge").
In its socially defined sense. See Pierre L. Van den Berghe, Race and Racism: A Com-
parative Perspective 9 (1967) (incorporating physical criteria into the definition).
" The data are available at http://www.census.gov. For census purposes, "race" is self-
reported and so responses will not necessarily track social definitions of race.
" Between 1850 and 1936, the Census Bureau collected membership data from religious
organizations. See 1 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States:
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level data are assembled by private parties,8' but even these num-
bers are not entirely dependable. Because the survey depends on
reporting by participating religious organizations, sometimes total
reported religious membership will exceed the best estimate of
the total population; on other occasions the "unclaimed" popu-
lation is implausibly high.82 Thus we can conclude with reasonable
confidence-and from any personal computer with Internet ac-
cess-that in the year 2000 there were approximately 17,080
McCreary County residents, of whom 108 identified themselves
as African American or black, nearly all of whom lived in the Pine
Knot area. But the fraction of the county's 2000 population un-
claimed by any participating religious organization is 76 percent.83
This number cannot say anything meaningful about religious life
and power in the county, given a local government that defended
multiple Ten Commandments displays against costly ACLU-
backed litigation.84
Even if demographic data on religion were perfect, sorting
would still be more difficult than a Tiebout enthusiast would pre-
fer. Aside from speech restrictions on real estate agents inspired
by the Fair Housing Act,8" there is the question of local political
power. This will never be transparent from demographic infor-
mation. More is needed, and a government's chosen symbols can
Colonial Times to 1970 at 389 (1975); Finke and Stark, The Churching ofAmerica at 16, 295
n 4 (cited in note 22). Although no religion data were collected by the Bureau after the
1940s, in 1976 Congress prohibited the Bureau from making religion-related questions
mandatory. See Pub L No 94-521, § 13(3), 90 Stat 2459 (1976) (codified at 13 USC §
22 1(c)).
" See Religious Congregations and Membership in the United States 2000: An Enumeration
by Region, State and County Based on Data Reported for 149 Religious Bodies (Dale E. Jones
et al, eds, 2001) (hereafter ASARB Data).
2 See generally id at xv-xvi (listing 39 counties where claimed adherents exceeded census
population figures and offering possible explanations); id at xiii-xiv (noting that none of
the historically African-American denominations participated in the 2000 survey).
3 See id at 209.
Among reported adherents, however, there is significant agreement: the Southern
Baptist Convention claims 83 percent (3,368) of all adherents (4,068); the next most
numerous are United Methodists who claim 8 percent (330). See id (listing seven other
groups, including one member of Baha'i).
" See notes 206-08 and accompanying text. Whatever is the correct statutory inter-
pretation, real estate agents are sometimes trained to avoid discussing demographics. See
Rhonda L. Daniels, Fair Housing Compliance Guide 15-16 (1990) (regarding ethnic com-
position); Hannah v Sibcy Cline Realtors, 147 Ohio App 3d 198, 205, 769 NE2d 876, 881
(Ohio Ct App 2001) (describing an agent's practice of referring questions about religion
to, for example, the Jewish Federation). But cf. Lior J. Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities
in Residential Communities, 92 Va L Rev n 17 (forthcoming 2006) (noting that racial steering
seems to persist).
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help fill the gap. Like a Confederate battle flag hoisted above a
public beach 6 or a black-fist sculpture at a city's center, 7 symbols
can speak to the mix of decision makers on public questions along
with the groups most likely to feel welcome.
The concept is readily extended to religion. As a start, signaling
might be done by naming new cities after religious figures-Cor-
pus Christi, Kiryas Joel, Rajneeshpuram, Saint Paul, San Diego.8
Demographics may change over the decades and renaming mu-
nicipalities is disruptive, however. Today signaling might be ac-
complished by placing a large Latin cross at the center of town;8 9
depicting religious symbols on city signs, vehicles, and offices;9"
carving religious messages into key government buildings;9" or
zoning a church into a place of pride.92 In these ways, a political
community can inform outsiders or remind insiders of the dom-
inant local culture, and thus help maintain preferred spiritual dem-
ographics.
A modern example is the City of Republic in southwestern Mis-
86 Compare Daniels v Harrison County Bd. of Supervisors, 722 So2d 136 (Miss 1998)
(permitting the flag to stay, along with seven flags that formerly flew over what is now
Mississippi).
" Compare Pat Zacharias, The Monuments of Detroit, Detroit News (2002) (describing
and depicting a 24-foot-long, ungloved, horizontal, forearm-and-fist memorial dedicated
to boxer Joe Louis).
" Compare Oregon v City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F Supp 1208 (D Or 1984) (involving
Oregon's refusal to recognize a city in territory developed by followers of the Bhagwan
Rajneesh).
'9 Compare Paulson v City of San Diego, 294 F3d 1124, 1125-28 (9th Cir 2002) (en banc)
(involving a mountaintop plot with a 43-foot-tall cross), cert denied, 538 US 978 (2003).
90Compare Robinson v City of Edmond, 68 F3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir 1995) (invalidating
a seal that incorporated a cross), cert denied, 517 US 1201 (1996); Harris v City of Zion,
927 F2d 1401, 1412-15 (7th Cir 1991) (similar), cert denied, 505 US 1229 (1992); Friedman
v Board of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo, 781 F2d 777, 782 (10th Cir 1985) (en banc) (similar),
cert denied, 476 US 1169 (1986); ACLU v City of Stow, 29 F Supp 2d 845, 851-52 (ND
Ohio 1998) (similar). But cf. Murray v City of Austin, 947 F2d 147, 149, 155 (5th Cir
1991) (permitting a seal in light of its connection to Stephen Austin's coat of arms), cert
denied, 505 US 1219 (1992).
" Compare Lambeth v Board of Comm'rs of Davidson County, 407 F3d 266, 267-68 (4th
Cir 2005) (upholding dismissal of a challenge to a decision to inscribe "In God We Trust"
in 18-inch block letters on the facade of the County Government Center).
92 Compare Dianna Smith, Landmark Church Slated for Ave Maria Development, Naples
Daily News (Mar 25, 2004) (describing plans for a town including Ave Maria University
and a 150-foot-tall church with a 40-foot-tall body of Christ). According to one report,
the founder of the university indicated the church "is there to remind the people 'what
we're about."' Id. For lists of intentional communities with spiritual missions, see http:/
/directory.ic.org. For a network of Christian real estate agents, see http://www
.hismove.com/about-us.htm.
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FIG. I.-Official flag of the City of Republic, Missouri (1991-99). Source: "Flags of the
VAorld," http://www.crwflags.com/fotxv/flags/us-nmorep.htnl.
souri. 93 After running a contest for a city flag and seal, the local
government chose an elliptical shape with symbols in four quad-
rants. On the bottom half were images of a traditional nuclear
family and a fish, or ichthys, commonly associated with Christianity
(see fig. 1). The seal was displayed on city buildings, city vehicles,
city stationery, and city-limit signs.94 A local minister declared that
the ACLU had correctly associated the ichthys with Jesus Christ,
adding, "I say the line is drawn. Stay out of Republic. We're going
to stand for Christian principles."95 Municipalities with exclusively
secular missions could send messages equally overt.96
One feature of religious faith, moreover, makes public symbols
especially useful devices for sorting. Individual religious commit-
ments are relatively opaque. So even if municipalities had con-
stitutional authority to exclude newcomers on the basis of reli-
gion-and they do not 97-signaling community character might
still be valuable. It empowers outsiders to sort themselves based on
See Webb v Cty of Republic, 55 F Supp 2d 994 (,VD Mo 1999).
14 See id at 995; id at 996 (quoting plaintiffs deposition testimony).
" Id at 999 (quoting comments at a board of aldermen meeting, and noting statements
of two residents who claimed to have moved into the city because of the ichtbys); see also
id at 996 (explaining that plaintiff and her children moved out). The court enjoined use
of the icbtbys, but on anti -proselytism grounds and without confronting sorting arguments.
See id at 1000-01.
96 See text at note 166 (discussing the southwest Missouri town of Liberal in the late
1800s).
") See Part III.A.1.
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privately held beliefs.98 In addition, subsets of outsiders will have
greater difficulty clueing in on local religious culture and power.
Such information is less easily available to secularists and non-
denominational religionists. For members of religious groups,
finding co-adherents is usually easy. If organized, these associa-
tions often advertise themselves, and might offer information
about their comfort within a locality. Perhaps yet again unlike
race, shared religious faith usually comes with a social network
for adherents.
The endorsement test, however unwittingly, already inhibits
such efforts to encourage sorting. Though formulated in the tra-
dition of anti-proselytism, the test's outcomes are not sufficiently
predictable to work around with certainty. And supporting reli-
gious symbols can be costly, aside from foregone residents. Or-
ganizations like the ACLU sometimes sue, attorney's fees are avail-
able if a lawsuit is successful,99 some municipalities are not wealthy,
and those with only weak preferences for religious homogeneity
are not likely to spend much to fight about it. 0 The costs do cut
both ways. Costly signals are credible signals,"°1 so current doctrine
may facilitate signaling-maybe especially if the government loses
in litigation. What better sign of loyalty to religious referents than
a bull-headed defense of the state's commitment to religious sym-
bols? On the other hand, there are Rule 11 risks for government
lawyers, and few officials are both dedicated to uniformity in re-
ligious faith and as confrontational as Roy Moore, in light of the
alternatives.
The point about alternatives is worth emphasizing. The case
for outsider ignorance is easy to overstate. A variety of non-gov-
ernment conduct indicates local religious character: the number,
denomination, and location of visibly religious structures
(churches, synagogues, mosques, and so forth); Christmas lights
on houses; fishlike emblems on cars; "WWJD" pendants on peo-
98 A similar argument is elaborated with respect to private property rights in Lior J.
Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 Mich L Rev (forthcoming
2006) (discussing "exclusionary vibes").
9 See 42 USC § 1988.
100 See John Witte, Jr., Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment: Essential Rights
and Liberties 173 (2000).
See generally Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 18-27 (2000).
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pie.' °2 Residents were already using the ichthys in southwest Mis-
souri when Republic appropriated it; °3 indeed, popular use made
it possible for the symbol to serve a sorting function. Furthermore,
unavailable information on religious demographics might be de-
pendably correlated with available information, like voting pat-
terns, race, and urban/rural setting.' 4 With effort, intelligent peo-
ple can understand how a locality functions. That said, gradations
of difficulty can make a difference in the extent of religious sorting,
especially if it is a soft preference for substantial numbers of peo-
ple." 5 Accurate information about religion and local power, more-
over, is especially challenging for an outsider to obtain.
III. ANTI-SORTING PRINCIPLES
The foregoing explains how religious symbols can be used
to match a community-preferred character with individual reli-
gious identities. This is not a reason to interfere with the sorting
process, however, least of all by constitutional law. Remember that
Tiebout and his followers built a theory to justify intramunicipal
uniformity of preferences, intermunicipal diversity in policy, and
competition for residents. So geographic clustering by religion
might be welfare enhancing, at least in the short run.
On the other hand, Tiebout sorting is not obviously entrenched
in constitutional law. Although courts recognize a constitutional
right of interstate migration °6 and a qualified right of private
associations to exclude people on some criteria,"0 7 otherwise the
Tiebout model is largely a question of subconstitutional policy.
102 Compare William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence
Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies 60-61 (2001) (canvassing
studies regarding the likelihood and impact of Tiebout sorting on public school quality).
's See Webb v City of Republic, 55 F Supp 2d 994, 999 (WD Mo 1999).
114 Compare LarryL. Hunt and Matthew 0. Hunt, Race, Region, and Religious Involvement:
A Comparative Study of Whites and African Americans, 80 Social Forces 605, 615, 622 (2001)
(reporting higher religious participation by African Americans than whites in the urban
South).
1o5 Compare Darren E. Sherkat, Religious Intermarriage in the United States: Trends, Pat-
terns, and Predictors, 33 Social Sci Res 606, 611-13, 619 (2004) (reporting that more than
half of surveyed Caucasian marriages were interfaith).
106 See Saenz v Roe, 526 US 489, 500 (1999).
107 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v Dale, 530 US 640, 659 (2000) (relying on interference
with expressive mission). But cf. Roberts v United StatesJaycees, 468 US 609, 626-27 (1984)
(finding insufficient burden on expressive interests to justify gender discrimination in
voting).
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Neither persons nor groups are constitutionally entitled to a gov-
ernment that mirrors their policy preferences. Furthermore, con-
stitutional case law plainly rejects state-facilitated sorting in some
circumstances. Race is the familiar example. Today a city is con-
stitutionally barred from designating residential space for whites
only, even if every current resident supports the regulation and
regardless of housing opportunities elsewhere." °8 It is easy for us
to see government-backed racial separation as part of a caste sys-
tem, inhibiting individual liberty while reinforcing categorical dis-
tinctions between people that now seem irrational at best. Judicial
concern with racial sorting, moreover, goes beyond officials out-
right forcing people to physically separate along racial lines. More
subtle forms of encouragement or facilitation sometimes prompt
judicial intervention."0 9
Is the Constitution a like impediment to separation along re-
ligious lines? May government officials intentionally encourage re-
ligious sorting across political boundaries? Knowingly facilitate
such sorting? Decline to inhibit or remedy such sorting? Perhaps
not, but these questions should not be answered by lockstep anal-
ogy to race cases. Religion and race are different phenomena.
Decades of debating, litigating, legislating, politicking, and the-
orizing about sorting by race will not simply carry over to religion.
For example: (1) our national experience and constitutional
traditions differ with respect to religion and race; (2) race, as
socially defined, is visible in a way that religion need not be; (3)
religion, according to some conceptions, is connected to value
systems and organization in ways that race need not be; (4) the
number of religions in America is almost countless, whereas the
concept of race might produce fewer salient divisions; (5) the desire
or impetus for sorting may differ with respect to race and religion.
These distinctions indicate the possibility of justifiably different
treatment.
Without pretending to offer comprehensive solutions, the rest
of this article digs into the constitutional law of religious sorting.
It focuses on aspects of the problem that have been underappre-
"' See also Runyon v McCrary, 427 US 160, 175-76 (1976) (permitting application of
a civil rights statute to private schools with admissions policies that excluded racial
minorities).
9 See Anderson v Martin, 375 US 399, 402 (1964) (invalidating a requirement that
candidate race be noted on ballots); Part III.B. 1. (exploring possible versions of anti-sorting
principles).
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ciated, including legal history, demographics, and doctrinal im-
plications. Only a humble constitutional rule seems defensible at
this time. But to understand the choice set, I will push the anti-
sorting arguments much further. For example, an entirely plausible
distinction between intentional government mandates and unwit-
ting government facilitation of religious sorting will not be im-
posed at the outset. Accordingly, the discussion starts with prec-
edent and the best justifications for an anti-sorting principle of
any dimension, then turns to more concrete versions and possible
implications, and closes with powerful objections to ambitious
anti-sorting rules enforced by courts.1 '
A. JUSTIFICATIONS
1. Sorting precedent. There are two key building blocks in Su-
preme Court precedent for an anti-sorting principle. The first is
a case about exclusion. Upon learning that a Santeria church was
planned for construction within the City of Hialeah, a series of
ordinances was adopted. 1 ' Part of the Santeria faith calls for an-
imal sacrifice, and the practical effect of the ordinances was to
outlaw "ritual" animal sacrifice without threatening kosher butch-
ers." 2 The Court unanimously held the ordinances invalid. Going
out of its way to teach the locals a lesson, the majority explained
that Santeria is a religion for First Amendment purposes even
though the city did not argue otherwise.113 The opinion opened
with the observation that local officials "did not understand, failed
to perceive, or chose to ignore the fact that their official actions
"0 Religious sorting is also a pure policy question, and there are familiar objections to
the Tiebout model in any case. Critics argue that, for example: (1) the original model
needs a political system, and its assumptions-such as perfect information, no externalities,
and dividends providing all income for the citizenry-must be loosened; (2) subsequent
empirical work suggests that residential choices are primarily driven by factors other than
government services and taxes, like family and employment needs; and (3) Tiebout sorting
is normatively controversial if one is committed to certain notions of social equality, voice-
based democracy, and public-spirited citizenship. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, City Making:
Building Cities Without Walls 168-73 (1999); Paul W Rhode and Koleman S. Strumpf,
Assessing the Importance of Tiehout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990, 93 Am
Econ Rev 1648 (2003); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Beyond Tiehout: Modeling the Political Economy
of Local Government, in George R. Zodrow, ed, Local Provision of Public Services: The Tiebout
Model After Twenty-five Years 56-57 (1983). But only some of the standard objections are
relevant here. They must plausibly relate to constitutional law.
.. See Church of the Lukumi Bahalu Aye, Inc. v City of Hialeah, 508 US 520, 526 (1993).
12 See id at 535-36.
' See id at 531; see also id at 541-42 (opinion of Kennedy, J, joined by Stevens, J).
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violated the Nation's essential commitment to religious free-
dom."' 14
Commentators discuss the Santeria case as a matter of free ex-
ercise,"' and it is surely that. Presumably the same result would
obtain if the state of Florida or the federal government adopted
the same rules for animal sacrifice. But in the spirit of Tiebout,
the Court might have told the newcomers to sort themselves into
a more accepting municipality."6 Or, recognizing that the City of
Hialeah could not have guaranteed Santeria space in any other
jurisdiction, the Court might have distinguished a hypothetical
statewide program that achieved such a guarantee. But nothing in
the Court's decision is so pro-sorting. It does not suggest that a
municipality may expel a disfavored religion from its territory as
long as another municipality stays open. To the contrary, the opin-
ion-protecting "the Nation's essential commitment" to religious
liberty"-indicates opposition to sect-targeted and government-
backed efforts to achieve local homogeneity. For federal consti-
tutional purposes, then, religion looks more like race than wealth:
localities may more or less explicitly zone for homogeneity in the
latter but not the former.118 The Court would blanch at overt
government efforts to restrict migration of African-Americans to
select communities even if 99 percent of residential property
within the region remained open. A different result seems unlikely
for denominations like Santeria." 9
114 Id at 524.
.l. See, e.g., Schragger, 117 Harv L Rev at 1852 (cited in note 13).
116 Compare City of Renton v Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 US 41, 53-54 (1986) (munic-
ipality could isolate sexually explicit movie theaters to 5 percent of the city's total area,
even if that left no commercially viable locations); Miller v California, 413 US 15, 24 (1973)
(permitting community standards to help define obscenity); see also City of Erie v Pap's
A.M., 529 US 277, 301-02 (2000) (plurality opinion) (municipality could apply a public
nudity ban to nude dancing in strip clubs). But cf. Schad v Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452
US 61, 76 (1981) (municipality violated speech rights by zoning out live entertainment,
including nude dancing at an adult bookstore-at least in the absence of evidence that
"the kind of entertainment appellants wish to provide is available in reasonably nearby
areas"); Mary Anne Case, Community Standards and the Margin of Appreciation, 25 Human
Rts L J I0, 10-11 (2005) (noting that obscenity law seems to be an outlier).
117 Lukumi, 508 US at 524 (emphasis added).
1l8 See Village ofArlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 US 252 (1977);
Buchanan v Warley, 245 US 60, 70-71, 81-82 (1917).
'9 The Court stressed that Santeria had been purposefully and effectively singled out
by the city for disfavor, see Lukumi, 508 US at 534, 545-46, thereby distinguishing broader
legislation with an equally burdensome impact when applied to ritual sacrifice. But this
problem of effective substitutes for overt discrimination is not special to anti-sorting
principles.
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Even so, the Hialeah decision is not entirely anti-sorting. In
fact it might be read as pro-sorting but anti-subordination. In the
spirit of Carolene Products12' rather than Charles Tiebout, the Court
might have been protecting the interests of non-mainstream re-
ligions to sort themselves however they wish. Perhaps Santeria's
victory means that the local political unpopularity of a migrant's
religion, like her race, is not something she should have to worry
about while sorting. But even with a useful concept of "minority
religion" within a multitude of faiths, this reading is not quite
right. The Court's concern goes beyond empowering minorities
to join a locality that prefers to maintain its religious composition.
The point is made by a second and more controversial case. A
year after the Hialeah decision, the New York legislature was re-
buked for drawing a new public school district at the request of
the Satmar Hasidim. 1' The district's boundaries would have
matched the Satmars' residential enclave in the Village of Kiryas
Joel, and the Court balked at officials consciously aligning political
institutions with religious geography.'22 This was true even though
both the Satmars and the adjacent community were probably
grateful for the partition. The former wanted the new district to
provide special education services apart from non-Satmar students,
who were a source of discomfort and humiliation for their chil-
dren. 123
The ramifications of the case are unclear, however. The decision
did not entail invalidation of the Satmars' village, for example,
even though it was religiously homogenous by any standard.124
"0 See United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 153 n 4 (1938).
'2' See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v Grumet, 512 US 687, 690 (1994).
122 See id at 698-702 & n 6 (plurality opinion) (condemning the act for districting by
religious criterion); id at 711 (Stevens, J, concurring) (asserting that the act "affirmatively
supports a religious sect's interest in segregating itself"); id at 728 (KennedyJ, concurring)
("[G]overnment may not use religion as a criterion to draw political or electoral lines.");
see also Larkin v Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 US 116 (1982) (invalidating a delegation to
churches of veto power over liquor licenses); cf. Lynch, 465 US at 687-88 (O'Connor, J,
concurring) (condemning "excessive entanglement with religious institutions, which may
. . . foster the creation of political constituencies defined along religious lines"); Lupu,
96 Colum L Rev at 108-09 (cited in note 13) (noting residency incentives for Satmars
arguably created by the special district).
123 See Kiryas Joel, 512 US at 692; see also id at 691-93 (noting earlier conflicts over
zoning and special education at an off-site location); note 2 above (noting Aguilar was
later overruled).
124 See KiryasJoel, 512 US at 703 n 7 (distinguishing the village); id at 729-30 (Kennedy,
J, concurring) (same).
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Why not? The majority's worry was that state officials purpose-
fully singled out the Satmars for special treatment in creating the
school district; but that problem does not apply to the village.125
"State action" was needed to get either one, of course. But the
state might have been too conscious of sectarian beneficiaries in
dealing with the school district, and failed adequately to assure
empathy for similarly situated communities. By contrast, the vil-
lage's boundaries were generated by a process facially neutral with
respect to religion. Any group could seek municipal status by that
process."6 If we assume the Satmar village is constitutionally per-
missible, perhaps the state may facilitate sorting by all groups, as
long as it does not purposefully facilitate religious sorting. On the
other hand, an anti-subordination principle might reenter the pic-
ture here; it could restrict the benefits of municipal status for
religiously monolithic communities to systematic losers in the po-
litical process. After all, the Satmars traveled a long way before
reaching Kiryas Joel, ultimately seeking village status to escape
restrictive zoning ordinances burdening their way of life. The
character of any principle underlying the case is thus undefined.
One limit to the Court's opposition to religious sorting should
be emphasized here. The attention is on religious cleavages that
match political boundaries, but not all boundaries will be policed.
This is a fair inference from race cases. A majority of the Court
has been concerned when officials draw legislative districts to
match racial demographics.'27 Yet dissenters in those cases-all of
whom voted to invalidate the Satmars' special school district-
indicated that religion is a presumptively valid basis on which to
draw legislative districts.'28 The majority did not disagree on the
5 See id at 690; id at 717 (O'Connor, J, concurring) (indicating a preference for ac-
commodations that benefit both religious and secular groups); see also Grumet v Pataki,
720 NE2d 66 (NY 1999) (striking a subsequent, nominally neutral statute), cert denied,
528 US 946 (1999).
126 But cf. Oregon v City of Rajneesbpuram, 598 F Supp 1208 (D Or 1984) (refusing to
dismiss a state's constitutional objection to the formation of a city by followers of the
Bhagwan Rajneesh, which would have been solely composed of a county road and church-
owned property).
27 See, e.g., Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 910-11 (1995).
See id at 944-45 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting) ("Our Nation's cities are full of districts
identified by their ethnic character-Chinese, Irish, Italian, Jewish, Polish, Russian, for
example."); Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630, 679 (1993) (Stevens, J, dissenting) ("If it is per-
missible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for union
members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows
that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose
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religion point,129 and nobody contended that such districting
needed to relieve religious subordination. Why the free pass on
legislative districts?
A simple explanation turns on the different functions served by
jurisdictional boundaries. In legislative districting, officials mold
the membership of a decision-making body drawn from a given
citizenry. Those representatives later assemble and make policy.
District lines no doubt affect the legislature's composition, but
homogeneity within districts will not necessarily have a serious
impact on influence within the assembly. In drawing state and
municipal boundaries, however, the citizenry itself is defined. This
is important as long as state and local governments retain signif-
icant decision-making authority of their own. 30 And homogeneity
within such polities is undeniably connected to influence over what
is taught in public schools, who enjoys exemptions from regula-
tion, which books show up in public libraries, who runs the local
courts, and so on. Religious anti-sorting principles are aimed at
the manufacture of such polities.
2. Sorting experiments and legal change. Details aside, the Satmar
and Santeria decisions indicate that special government efforts to
promote religious homogeneity are sometimes invalid. But can we
justify, or at least account for, the precedent? Is there a legitimate
constitutional foundation for anti-sorting principles?
Arguments from plain text or original meaning at the founding
are unlikely suspects. The First Amendment's religion clauses were
drafted as restraints on "Congress" and, by logical extension, the
rest of the federal government. 31 The posture of state and local
governments toward religion was an issue for them to resolve.
3 2
As such, the Federal Constitution of 1791 was at most agnostic
history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause."); Mary Anne
Case, Lessons for the Future of Affirmative Action from the Past of the Religion Clauses? 2000
Supreme Court Review 325, 340-41.
29 See Miller, 515 US at 918 (indicating that respect for "communities defined by actual
shared interests" helps defeat race-based equal protection attacks on legislative districts).
130 Compare Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty:Jurisdictional Formation
and Racial Segregation, 49 Stan L Rev 1365 (1997) (arguing that racial segregation at the
municipal level is more troubling than in the electoral districting context). Constituent
services do connect the function of electoral districts with municipalities, however.
"' The guarantee might be a dead-letter otherwise, or the conduct of other branches
might be traced back to congressional authorization. See also US Const, Art VI, cl 3
(barring religious tests for federal office).
13 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 32-34,
41 (1998).
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about religious sorting. And the explicit promise that Congress
would make no law "respecting" an establishment of religion made
the document arguably pro-sorting."' Whatever else the clause
meant when ratified, it indicated restraints on the ability of the
federal government to interfere with state religious "establish-
ments." So a constitutional anti-sorting norm depends on move-
ment since 1791. The importance of the Fourteenth Amendment
and subsequent constitutional theory is examined below. However,
the argument should begin with government policy predating the
Constitution and the dramatic legal change thereafter. This history
is sufficiently intriguing that countless scholars have traced and
retraced it. But major developments that are crucial from a sorting
perspective are not highlighted in contemporary legal scholarship.
The fact is that our country ran an extended experiment with
religious sorting policies at the state and local level. These ex-
periments were intimately associated with official religious "es-
tablishments," and they did not survive. This history is commonly
seen as a regrettable episode of intolerant deprivations of religious
liberty and equality-a misstep to be forgiven in light of a pop-
ulation so much less diverse than today's.'3 4 But that homogeneity
was partly the result of purposeful official efforts to sculpt religious
demographics in the New World. Religious establishments were
part of a dynamic migration system. Less welcoming atmospheres
tend to ward off the less welcome, while attracting the favored
class. A religious-sorting perspective on American history em-
phasizes these dynamics.
The British colonies provided havens for Protestants, who had
strong incentives to sort themselves out of Europe, and for those
who thought the Church of England was corrupt.' The colonies
were sometimes advertised as such.'36 At the same time, these
' Compare US Const, Art I, § 9, cl 1 (barring Congress from prohibiting migration
of persons that existing States thought proper to admit, until 1808).
"' Compare, e.g., Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First
Amendment 9, 27 (1986) (missing the sorting dynamic when asserting that a State estab-
lishment of Christianity or Protestantism in 1790 would have been "for practical purposes,
a comprehensive or non-preferential establishment).
' See Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage
of the First Amendment 3 (1986); 1 Anson P. Stokes, Church and State in the United States
227 (1950).
136 See, e.g., Walter A. Knittle, Early Eighteenth Century Palatine Emigration 12, 22-31
(1937); id at 20 ("[In Germany,] Pennsylvania was the best advertised province and it was
mainly due to the liberal use of printer's ink.").
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outposts executed the most severe forms of intolerance against
other faiths. Certainly part of the story is about religious liberty
simpliciter. Regulation of religious practices, such as rules limiting
who could preach or perform legally recognized marriage cere-
monies,137 were obviously impositions on minorities within a given
colony. But such regulation and promotion also were mechanisms
that encouraged sorting during periods of mass migration.'38 For
a time, some colonies even adopted immigration laws to exclude
or deport those of the wrong religion. 39 A Virginia policy excluded
Catholics and Puritans; Massachusetts Bay Colony banished
Quakers and others. 4 ' In the latter case, Quakers faced the death
penalty for returning to Massachusetts, not simply for their her-
esy.141 The colony preferred conformity, to be sure, but the pri-
mary tool seems to have been population control rather than con-
version.
These formal exclusions were abandoned before separation from
the Crown, but efforts to shape the religious population continued.
Several early state governments officially preferred sets of religious
beliefs and practices. For example, South Carolina's 1778 Con-
stitution declared Protestantism the state's established religion.142
To achieve incorporated status, religious societies would have to
agree that Christianity is the "true religion," the New Testament
is "of divine inspiration," and there is a "future state of rewards
' See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part
I. Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev 2105, 2162, 2165-67, 2175 (2003).
"' See Stokes, 1 Church and State at 227-28 (cited in note 135) ("From the British
government's standpoint an object always in mind was a desire to prevent Roman Ca-
tholicism ...from getting the upper hand in North America."); McConnell, 44 Wm &
Mary L Rev at 2161-62 (cited in note 137) (discussing Massachusetts Bay Colony).
' See Edward P. Hutchinson, Legislative History of American Immigration Policy
1798-1965 at 389-90 (1981); Emberson E. Proper, Colonial Immigration Laws: A Study of
the Regulation of Immigration by the English Colonies in America 17-18, 26-27, 58-61 (1900)
(finding a general tendency to deny or discourage Catholic immigration).
"4 SeeJohn T Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience ofReligious
Freedom 51-53 (describing Massachusetts's policy from 1656 to 1681); McConnell, 44 Wm
& Mary L Rev at 2117, 2119 (cited in note 137) (describing Virginia's policy and its
apparent success regarding Catholics).
'' See Richard P. Hallowell, The Quaker Invasion of Massachusetts 139-43 (3d ed 1884)
(reproducing laws from 1658 and 1661); Noonan, The Lustre of Our Country at 52-53
(cited in note 140); see also Curry, The First Freedoms at 20-21 (cited in note 135) (noting
regional opposition to Quaker presence).
"' See SC Const, Art XXXV1II (1778), reprinted in 6 The Federal and State Constitutions:
Colonial Charters, And Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, And Colonies Now or
Heretofore Forming the United States of America 3255-57 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909)
(hereafter Thorpe).
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and punishments."'43 Such provisions were liberal compared to
colonial policy, but they still made statements about the religious
commitment expected of inhabitants."4
More important, some colonies and states taxed people for the
specific purpose of funding preferred churches or ministers. Vir-
ginia famously ran such a system for a time. Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, and New Hampshire authorized municipalities to select
a minister for tax-and-transfer, thereby further decentralizing
without rejecting religious establishments.145 From a sorting per-
spective, these programs might be superior to immigration laws.
The latter must have been difficult to enforce insofar as religious
commitments can be sustained without social visibility-a fact that
helps explain severe penalties for return after banishment. A tax,
in contrast, can be levied on all or many residents and the proceeds
then directed to an identifiable religious organization or figure.'46
In other words, officially preferred beneficiaries were probably
easier to identify than disfavored religionists. In addition, financ-
ing schemes that allowed people to opt out, or to direct their tax
contribution to minority religions,'47 can also facilitate sorting. To
choose one of these options is to identify oneself as a dissident.
Adherents to minority religions might well prefer to remain anon-
ymous, and so either conform or go elsewhere.
Not all states aimed to be narrowly sectarian enclaves. One
could avoid the Congregational influence in New England and
the Anglican establishments of some southern states by settling in
Delaware, PennsylvaniaNew Jersey, or Rhode Island. They billed
themselves as relatively open political societies.'48 The variance in
143 Id.
" See also, e.g., Mass Declaration of Rights, Art II (1780) ("It is the right as well as
the duty of all men in society, publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship the Supreme
Being .... "), reprinted in 3 Thorpe at 1889 (cited in note 142); cf. Va Declaration of
Rights § 16 (June 12, 1776) ("[I]t is the mutual duty of all to practise Christian forbearance,
love, and charity towards each other."), reprinted in 7 Thorpe at 3814 (cited in note 142);
Proper, Colonial Immigration Laws at 27 (cited in note 139) (noting voting rights
restrictions).
"' See generally Gerard V. Bradley, Church-State Relationships in America ch 2 (1987);
Levy, The Establishment Clause at 15-24 (cited in note 134) (noting exemptions for certain
sects at certain times).
.46 Not that tax collection was easy in that era. See Robert A. Becker, Revolution, Reform,
and the Politics of American Taxation, 1763- 1783 at 7, 116 (1980).
147 See Levy, The Establishment Clause at 27-28 (cited in note 134) (describing Massa-
chusetts law in 1780).
141 See generally id at 1, 5, 9-10, 25-26.
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church-state policies offered choices of politico-religious culture.
Many people must have made decisions accordingly.149 Forced to
characterize the early American law of religion as anti-liberty or
pro-sorting, one could easily favor the latter.
Either way, the formal establishments soon collapsed. Any An-
glican establishment was poorly situated to outlive the Revolution.
Other schemes failed as well. For instance, South Carolina's pro-
establishment clauses were repealed in 1790.'" Massachusetts' sys-
tem of locally established faiths, which outlasted all the other
formal establishments, was abolished in 1833.5' Buffeted by im-
migration, additional sources of religious diversity, and competing
economic interests,"5 2 the impulse for religiously closed states soft-
ened. Interfaith animosity was not eliminated, of course. If nothing
else, the experience of Catholics in the nineteenth century defeats
that claim.1 13 And religiously restrictive covenants were used to
shape local demographics long after the original establishments
were discontinued.'54 Yet the idea of state-orchestrated partition
of religious groups seems to have lost legitimacy in relatively short
order.
In fact, a sign of the change can be found in a passage of Justice
Harlan's dissent in Plessey v Ferguson. It put state-mandated reli-
gious segregation on a list of shocking hypotheticals that the sup-
porters of racial segregation were challenged to distinguish:
[I]f this statute of Louisiana is consistent with the personal
liberty of citizens, why may not the state require the separation
'4 See Finke and Stark, The Churching of America at 27-33, 285-89 (cited in note 22)
(extrapolating from data on the number and location of congregations and showing re-
gional variation).
IS' See SC Const, Art I, §§ 4, 6, 8, 23, Art II, §§ 2-3, Art VIII (1790), reprinted in 6
Thorpe at 3258-62, 3264 (cited in note 142); Levy, The Establishment Clause at 51 (cited
in note 134).
151 See Mass. Articles of Amend. XI (1833), reprinted in 3 Thorpe at 1914 (cited in note
142); see generally Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential"Aid to Religion: A False Claim About
Original Intent, 27 Wm & Mary L Rev 899-901 (1986).
152 See Schuck, Diversity in America at 261 (cited in note 13); Steven D. Smith, Getting
Over Equality 21 (2001) (asserting that pluralism, not doctrine, produced religious
freedom).
"' See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State ch 8 (2002); Kurt T. Lash,
The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablisbment Principle,
27 Ariz St LJ 1085, 1119-20 (1995).
"' See William E. Nelson and Norman R. Williams, Suburbanization and Market Failure:
An Analysis of Government Policies Promoting Suburban Growth and Ethnic Assimilation, 27
Fordham-Urban LJ 197, 215 (1999).
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in railroad coaches of native and naturalized citizens of the
United States, or of Protestants and Roman Catholics?'
This statement might support only a narrow anti-sorting rule,
involving legally coerced segregation by religion. But it's a start.
3. Anti-sorting in theory. Entrenching every perceived resolution
of political conflict is no way to do constitutional law, of course.
Anti-sorting principles need arguments to distinguish them from
other trends. As a matter of constitutional text, the critical sources
are the state-restraining provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But because that text is so underspecified, and because its inspi-
ration was chattel slavery, a religion-oriented anti-sorting norm
must be reinforced with a broader or different constitutional the-
ory. This is not the place for a fully articulated sorting theory or
an end to the "incorporation" debate. Normative and empirical
uncertainties strongly caution against a robust anti-sorting prin-
ciple, anyway. Yet with a little effort, we can see the structure of
the argument. And this structure will further the equally chal-
lenging task of grinding out concrete versions of the principle.
There are two promising routes to a constitutional anti-sorting
principle. Both rely on implications of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Reconstruction. 6 The first route is conventional yet synergistic.
The concept of "law respecting an establishment of religion" would
be borrowed from the First Amendment and converted into a pro-
hibition on state action by one or more clauses in the Fourteenth.
The second route does not directly rely on First Amendment con-
cepts. Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment itself underwrites an anti-
sorting norm. Either way, the argument is above and beyond the
particularities of Establishment Clause interpretation. These two
lines of the argument can then be joined with modem political theory,
concern for consequences, and empirical data." 7
Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537, 558 (1896) (Harlan, J, dissenting).
156 These arguments are heavily influenced by the work of Akhil Amar, Christopher
Eisgruber, and Kenneth Karst. See Amar, The Bill of Rights at 248-57 (cited in note 132);
Eisgruber, Madison at 351-355, 371-78, 381-88 (cited in note 13); Christopher L. Eis-
gruber, Ethnic Segregation by Religion and Race: Reflections on Kiryas Joel and Shaw v. Reno,
26 Cumb L Rev 515, 515-22 (1996); Eisgruber, Assimilation at 92 (cited in note 13);
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and the Powers of Government, 41 UCLA L Rev
1297, 1323-28 (1994); Kenneth L. Karst, Justice O'Connor and the Substance of Equal Cit-
izenship, 2003 Supreme Court Review 357; Karst, 27 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 512-25 (cited
in note 45).
" Conventional Religion Clause theories are not terribly useful here. See Hugh Baxter,
Managing Legal Change: The Transformation of Estahlishment Clause Law, 46 UCLA L Rev
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a) The first path depends on certain understandings of both the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. The latter explicitly restrains
state action in multiple ways that might be relevant: protecting
privileges or immunities, guaranteeing liberty with due process,
demanding equal protection of the laws; even the grants of national
and state citizenship can be relied on. A free-exercise norm, more-
over, fits easily within these concepts. There is even Fourteenth
Amendment drafting history to that effect. 5 ' Excluding people or
organizations from states or municipalities, such as Hialeah's at-
tempt to prevent Santeria's immigration, is thus relatively easy to
prohibit under the Fourteenth Amendment. The result in the San-
teria case shielded a sect from a ritual-targeting government pro-
hibition. But for discretionary benefits like a school district for the
Satmars, the constitutional problem is harder to see (at least if equal
protection norms are satisfied). In some ways the new district pro-
moted religious liberty-perhaps not a system of liberty in which
multiple sects thrive and interact, but surely the religious autonomy
of the Satmars was served. It is not even clear that the new district
would have required substantial additional tax dollars from outsiders
who might object. This suggests that more must be done to artic-
ulate a non-establishment norm that plausibly can be appropriated
by the Fourteenth Amendment. After all, the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment was a federalism-promoting concession to
the states that resists an easy transplant into the Fourteenth.
The best argument on this track is that the American view of
religious establishments changed between 1791 and 1868. Perhaps
it moved from local option to liberty killer. Even ignoring stare
decisis, there is material to support this thesis. However discon-
nected disestablishment was from the notion of religious liberty at
the founding, these ideas were sometimes coupled by the time the
343, 351 n 32 (1998) (collecting theories). "Substantive neutrality," which prefers to min-
imize the impact of state action on religious choices, always has a difficult time selecting
a subset of government conduct to monitor, and it is not immediately clear what baseline
is best for sorting purposes. More important, a simple neutrality theory-whether "sub-
stantive" or "formal"-will not explain why federal action seems to be treated more le-
niently than analogous state and local action. Theorists seeking to maximize religious
liberty (e.g., those who are pro-"accommodation" plus anti-"coercion") cannot be sure
whether sorting across political boundaries diminishes religiosity or alters its mix in a
problematic way. Finally, "strict separation" would be highly concerned with overt state
efforts to build religion-sustaining political enclaves. But not much is clear beyond that
and, in any event, the theory is infeasible in its strong forms and not particularly popular
in the courts, anyway.
" See Amar, The Bill of Rights at 253 (cited in note 132).
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Fourteenth Amendment was ratified."l 9 In fact, a few state and ter-
ritorial constitutions even mimicked the federal Establishment
Clause and its "law respecting" language.16 ° Thomas Cooley's 1868
treatise summarized state constitutions in just those terms.161 It is
extremely unlikely that these clauses reflected yet another structural
decision to decentralize religious questions to municipalities, and
they were certainly not cross-jurisdictional protection for other
states. A better explanation lies in the shift away from formal es-
tablishments among the original states, along with changing polit-
ical values in the West.'62 Government was by no means discon-
nected from religion in the 1800s; part of the allergy to
"church"-state connection, moreover, was anti-Catholicism that ac-
companied new waves of international immigration. 163 But subna-
tional "establishments" became incompatible with prevailing no-
tions of the proper relationship between government and religion.
And we now know that sorting accompanied state and colonial
programs regarding religion, we might conclude that government-
propelled religious messages are a component of any "establish-
ment" worthy of the name, and we are in any case much closer to
placing an anti-sorting norm within the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
64
Once the values of deregulated religious liberty and non-estab-
lishment are imported, anti-sorting is not only a matter of historical
analogy. The principle may be prophylactic, and here there is a
connection with anti-proselytism. Monitoring the conduct of of-
ficials within local religious enclaves can be difficult. Without ef-
59 See Lash, 27 Ariz St LJ at 1133 (cited in note 153) (asserting that "by Reconstruction,
northern state courts had translated the prohibition of the original Establishment Clause
to be an expression of fundamental religious liberty"); see also id at 1130.
6
'See id at 1133 & n 224.
'6 See Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon
the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 469-71 (1868) (distinguishing
"solemn recognition of a super-intending Providence in public transactions and exercises
as the general religious sentiment requires"-at least to meet secular goals of public
morality and order).
162 See Amar, The Bill of Rights at 248-52 (cited in note 132).
163 See generally Hamburger, Separation of Church and State, ch 8 (cited in note 153);
see also Adam M. Samaha, Separation Rhetoric and Its Relevance, 19 Const Comm 713,
728-30 (2002) (book review) (analyzing the muted relevance of the failed Blaine
Amendment).
" Compare McConnell, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev at 2131 (cited in note 137) (asserting
that "establishment" means "the promotion and inculcation of a common set of beliefs
through governmental authority" and noting variations in coerciveness). The best defi-
nition of "establishment" and the propriety of prophylactic measures beyond it are con-
troversial questions, but no less difficult for anti-proselytism principles.
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fective monitoring, however, these enclaves can disrupt political
choices at the state and national levels. Furthermore, sorting will
often be imperfect. This was true even under colonial regimes.'65
Religious faith can be relatively invisible if an individual so chooses,
while non-religious reasons plainly affect location decisions. Thus
a municipality dominated by one sect might still have non-con-
formists to deal with. Leaving the law to such imperfectly sorted
religious enclaves can therefore threaten social policy. Nor is the
threat restricted to sectarian proselytizing and ostracism. There is
likewise reason to worry that imperfectly sorted secular enclaves
will disregard constitutional guarantees of religious liberty. And the
more generous one is with free exercise rights, the more worried
one should be about secular dominance within a political com-
munity. As such the sectarian vision of Republic, Missouri, in the
1990s was not categorically different from the atheistic aspiration
of Liberal, Missouri, in the 1880s-a town more than happy to
declare its official opinion that "MAN'S SAVIOR MUST BE MAN
AL ONE.
, 6 6
Fears persist, moreover, even when sorting is complete. A night-
mare scenario is suggested by charges against the Fundamentalist
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints in Colorado City,
Arizona. Members allegedly sorted themselves into relative isola-
tion, minimized access to communications technology, taught the-
ories of racial superiority, subordinated girls to patriarchal domi-
nation, banished hundreds of teenage boys to maintain a gender
imbalance for polygyny, used government officials to further
Church diktats concerning romantic relationships, and diverted tax
dollars intended for public schools to Church operations. 67 In fact,
6' See Part III.A.2.; cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 Harv L Rev 1399,
1456-57 (2005) (noting the constraints of bundled choices, change of preferences over
time, and transition costs of sorting and re-sorting if local legal rules are flat and fixed).
66 Philip Hamburger, Illiberal Liberalism: Liberal Theology, Anti-Catholicism, and Church
Property, 12 J Contemp Legal Issues 693, 702 n 29 (2002) (citation omitted) (adding that
"the happiest and best community is that one which is the freest from the dogmas of
religion"). Seances were popular in the town, however. See J. P. Moore, This Strange
Town-Liberal, Missouri 74 (1963).
67 See David Kelly, Lost to the Only Life They Knew, L.A. Times (June 13, 2005) at Al;
Petition for Appointment of Receiver, In re Colorado City Unified Sch. Dist. No. 14,
Case No. 2005-001, at 8-10 (Aug 12, 2005) (filed with the Arizona State Board of Ed-
ucation) (noting that all school board members and administrators are FLDS members,
and charging them with mismanaging district property to the benefit of FLDS). The
Attorney General's petition alleges, for example, that the district purchased an airplane
and later was unable to pay teachers' salaries. See id at 4, 8.
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"diversion" loses meaning in this context. If critics are correct about
Colorado City, local government authority is now an arm of the
Church and wielded to achieve religious goals. This fits any plau-
sible definition of religious establishment. Separation of church and
state might be a poor slogan for the Establishment Clause, but
church-state integration is certainly not the vision. Anyway, the im-
portant argument for anti-sorting principles is that religious ho-
mogeneity makes such constitutional violations more likely. And in
an interconnected society with a substantial welfare state, "complete
exit" of religious groups is more difficult to achieve.'68
Religious sorting therefore should be most distressing to those
who support robust versions of anti-establishment norms. However
appealing one might think it to rope off "the government" from
religious symbols, religious justifications for public policy, and sub-
sidies benefiting religious institutions, those goals will be harder to
obtain if the community is monolithically dedicated to one version
of religious faith.169 All the more so at the local level where the
public/private line, often by design, is faintest.
b) The argument for a principle disfavoring religious sorting is
bolstered by an alternative path. Post-Reconstruction ideals of cit-
izenship and nationalism may support it. Kenneth Karst is a leader
here. He forged a theoretical connection between race and religion
through the concept of equal citizenship. 7 ° He did so in service of
nationalism-some bare minimum of national identity and civic
unity in a multicultural country,'7' which stands against exclusionary
or polarizing use of race and religion in politics. Race might be
more salient in America, but religion is another tool with which
politicians and officials can divide the country. Engineering a desired
composition of religion within a political boundary is a literal ex-
ample of this feared partition. And one can reach these conclusions
without specifying the best interpretation of the First Amend-
ment.'72
68 Compare Greene, 96 Colum L Rev at 8, 17 (cited in note 13) (discussing complete
exit and partial eit).
169 An attempt to hold all of these positions, and grant legislatures the option to authorize
political enclaves for "minority" religions, is id at 24-26, 83 n 329, 85 n 335, 86.
, See Karst, 27 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 512-25 (cited in note 45).
See Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution 101,
173 (1989).
172 Compare Amar, The Bill of Rights at 254 (cited in note 132) (concluding that Alabama
could not declare itself "the White Supremacy State" and suggesting the same for Utah
declaring itself "the Mormon State").
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Yet insofar as racial sorting implicates fears of perpetual subor-
dination, religious sorting is distinct. Perhaps few believe that race
is a normatively defensible category for many purposes and all else
equal, instead of a social fact or a tool for organizing disadvantaged
groups. But religion is another story. It is far more difficult to
demonstrate that society would be better off with the extermination
of religion as a category. Furthermore, free-exercise values suggest
that the Constitution prefers liberated religiosity. The Reconstruc-
tion Amendments, in contrast, are tough to read as promoting racial
identity for its own sake or even for instrumental purposes. Anti-
sorting would get more mileage out of a theory treating religion
as constitutionally valued and religious divisions as indissoluble.
The conventional legal logic begins to stretch thin, but perhaps
the nationalizing influence of the Civil War's resolution supports
a neo-Madisonian theory of religious faction. Madison's now-hack-
neyed insight was that the collection of interests into a single po-
litical institution could facilitate reasoned compromise"' or at least
prevent factional domination. He applied the theory to religious
sects in The Federalist.174 But he did not touch state and local affairs.
While Madison promoted federal constitutional guarantees of re-
ligious liberty against the states, he could not achieve it in the Bill
of Rights.'75 Yet the point is useful for an anti-sorting principle,
because it sees religion as politically powerful rather than habitually
subordinated. It recommends integrating multiple denominations
within political institutions. And it limits the principle to groups
dominating political jurisdictions, not simple geographic clumping.
Christopher Eisgruber pushes similar arguments, singling out or-
ganized religion from other interests. Although critical to healthy
societal diversity, he contends, religious groups are often cohesive,
impervious to ordinary rational argument, and uncompromising
because organized on matters of principle.'76 These characteristics
"' See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 19-20, 133-34, 347 (1993) (observing
a general structural tendency in the Constitution to promote reasoned deliberation).
174 See Federalist 10 in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 84 (1961) ("A religious
sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety
of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any
danger from that source."); Federalist 51 at 324.
"' Compare US Const, Amend I (singling out Congress), with Bernard Schwartz, The
Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of Rights 177, 233 (1977) (noting
Madison's support for an amendment protecting "the equal rights of conscience" from
state action).
76 See Eisgruber, Madison at 372-73 (cited in note 13).
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might be accentuated when reinforced with a matching political
boundary. Those lines can bolster group loyalty, and the use of
government machinery may help solve any remaining collective
action problems.
Such theories might leave little for a local government to decide,
though. Before we take constitutional law to nationalize the primary
school curriculum, it is worth recalling the virtues of decentralized
democracy. Aside from the hoped-for benefits of Tiebout sorting,
some democrats prefer a measure of decentralized government
power because it creates locations for citizen participation.177 The
wish is that people develop public-regarding arguments and inter-
ests, rather than simply presenting individual preferences for ag-
gregation.178 In addition, interaction might produce cross-cultural
knowledge and cooperation skills, which could themselves qualify
as public goods. Other democrats are not interested in or oppose
the goal of molding citizen interests through local politics, yet en-
courage decentralization for other reasons. Even representative
forms of local government can be superior to wholly centralized
power. Local officials might be better informed about local values
and conditions, and local residents might be better informed about
official conduct. If so, public policy can be more efficiently imple-
mented and officials can be better monitored.
Neither theory for decentralized democracy is seriously assisted
by religious homogeneity. This is clearer for participatory demo-
crats. Many of them want citizens to confront and understand dif-
ferences, not eliminate them by political boundaries or social pres-
sure to conform.'7 9 Representative democrats also have something
to fear from religious sorting, even if preference homogeneity has
upsides. One problem is group polarization.80 Given certain con-
ditions, a group of individuals predisposed toward one position will
end up supporting more extreme policies after deliberation than
177 See, e.g., Frug, City Making at 20-24 (cited in note 110); Benjamin R. Barber, Strong
Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age xiv-xv, 117 (1984).
178 See Iris M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy 108-20, 188-89 (2000); Iris M. Young,
Justice and the Politics of Difference 234-41 (1990); accord Diana L. Eck, A New Religious
America: How a "Christian Country" Has Now Become the World's Most Religiously Diverse
Nation 69-70 (2001).
7 See, e.g., Young, Justice at 237-38 (cited in note 178); cf. Lee C. Bollinger, The
Tolerant Society 9-10, 140-44 (1986) (justifying free speech as a method for developing
tolerance).
80 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale
LJ 71, 74-75 (2000).
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would have been predicted by their predeliberation preferences. In
addition, too few dissenters can lead to no disagreement being
voiced at all. And similar imbalances can generate cascades, as sub-
sequent evaluations are skewed by prior political victories.'' Some-
times these syndromes might happily produce exciting social ex-
periments. On other occasions the results might be disastrous,
without a guarantee that the effects will be wholly localized or that
participants will learn much from mistakes. Representative democ-
racy might dampen the risks, but this seems less likely at the local
level. As political boundaries encompass smaller populations, rep-
resentatives and constituents begin to mirror a single social group.
In this sense, secular enclaves are no different from their religious
counterparts.
Lastly, social trends might make an anti-sorting norm attractive
to many integrationists and nationalists. The country includes un-
deniably deep cultural divisions and religion plays a part. Few can
believe that the United States will fit strong versions of the secu-
larization thesis anytime soon,' while empirical work suggests:
" co-religionists are clumped regionally and sometimes lo-
cally"' 3-at the county level, perhaps to a degree now similar
to segregation scores for African Americans;' 84
" foreign immigration trends may be contributing to religious
separation, as newcomers sometimes bring shared religious
commitments to geographically distinct communities;'
• fundamentalist denominations are gaining proportionally to
SI See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent 5-13 (2003).
The expectation, shared by intellectuals from Marx to Mill to Durkheim, was that
modernity would diminish religiosity. See Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern
World 17-20, 211-12 (1994). Trends in some of Europe fit the thesis; but U.S. data are
more difficult to square. See Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, The Sacred and the Secular:
Religion and Politics Worldwide 5, 84-85, 94 (2004); Laurence R. Iannoccone, Introduction
to the Economics of Religion, 36 J Econ Lit 1465, 1468-72 (1998).
113 See ARIS Survey at 39-42 (cited in note 22) (exhibit 15) (breaking down responses
by state); Norris and Inglehart, The Sacred and the Secular at 94 (cited in note 182) (noting
regional and urban/rural differences).
114 See Rhode and Strumpf, 93 Am Econ Rev at 1670-71 (figures 5 and 6) (cited in note
110).
"' See, e.g., Norris and Inglehart, The Sacred and the Secular at 93-94 (cited in note
182) (noting that proportional shifts away from "mainline" Protestant growth can be partly
accounted for by immigration patterns); Rhode and Strumpf, 93 Am Econ Rev at 1672
(figure 7) (cited in note 110) (showing an increase in segregation by foreign birth, measured
by Gini and dissimilarity indices, from 1960 to 1990).
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other sects;'86
yet the percentage of the population unaffiliated with any re-
ligious institution is substantial, if not growing.'87
Religious segregation scores are worth pausing over. The cal-
culations of Professors Rhode and Strumpf suggest that, between
1890 and 1990, the nation became equally segregated at the county
level with respect to religions, African Americans, and the foreign
born-with the first score falling slightly, the second falling sub-
stantially, and the third recently increasing.'88 A single nationwide
number for "religion" is not undoubtedly comparable to that for
other social categories. The spatial distribution of many small sects
must be aggregated to get a single segregation score, 8 9 a handful
of larger sects predominate in respective regions of the country,
and our normative commitments are likely distinct in the religion
context. But segregation indices are not the only relevant data point.
With year 2000 county-level numbers, we can see that a single
denominational family exceeds 50 percent of claimed adherents in
a large number of counties.190 Although the percentage of residents
who are claimed varies significantly across counties, the numbers
may understate geographic unevenness in terms of anti-sorting con-
' See Finke and Stark, The Churching of America at 244-48 (cited in note 22); Norris
and Inglehart, The Sacred and the Secular at 94 (cited in note 182); lannoccone, 36 J Econ
Lit at 1471-72 (cited in note 182).
.87 See ARIS Survey at 10 & n 5, 13 (cited in note 22) (stating that in 2001, 14 percent
responded "no religion" to the question "What is your religion, if any?" compared to 8
percent in 1990, when the question was "What is your religion?"); Norris and Inglehart,
The Sacred and the Secular at 93 (figure 4.5) (cited in note 182) (showing a similar shift
from 1991 to 2002 in responses to a General Social Survey question). Other polling
indicates that about 94 percent of respondents will say they believe in some kind of god,
however, with results fairly steady since 1947. See Norris and Inglehart, The Sacred and
the Secular at 90 (table 4.1) (cited in note 182).
8 See Rhode and Strumpf, 93 Am Econ Rev at 1670-72 (figures 5-7) (cited in note
110) (showing scores from somewhat below 0.50 to about 0.60). Rhode and Strumpf's
trendlines for "religion" in figure 6 are Gini and dissimilarity scores. Those scores are
designed for a single group (see note 202)-not a single number for the 27 religion
categories used by the authors. The formula they used to aggregate the scores is reproduced
id at 1660-61; it is a population-weighted average for each category, modified with a
denominator that seems to further reduce the influence of small-group scores.
89 Compare Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir, and Caroline Hoxby, Political 7urisdictions in
Heterogeneous Communities, 112 J Pol Econ 348, 361 (2004) (table 1) (showing an average
county-level "heterogeneity" score of 0.631 for 17 Judeo-Christian groupings in 1990-
that is, there was a 63.1 percent probability that two randomly selected residents would
not be members of the same grouping).
'9 See ASARB Data (cited in note 81) (fold-out map) (grouping all Baptists and
Lutherans).
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cerns. A county that is relatively "diverse" as a whole might be
divided at a more local level. Cook County, Illinois, to take a fairly
extreme example, includes over 100 cities, villages, and towns, not
to mention dozens more special purpose districts for education,
parks, libraries, and so on. Strong anti-sorters might care about
each of these divisions.
As discussed below, some of these trends are untroubling or even
thrilling. Anti-sorting is not anti-diversity; indeed, it could be quite
the opposite. The principle is concerned with how social divisions
are institutionalized. When multiple social cleavages are piled upon
each other, and then reinforced by coinciding political boundaries,
there is cause to fear an overly fractionated country operating more
as a confederation of monolithic associations than a nation of people
sharing any fundamental commitment.
Likewise, it should be clear that anti-sorting principles are not
anti-religion in a strong sense. Dispersing fellow believers is not
the objective; the worry is alignment of religious and political bor-
ders. A denomination's geographic concentration is not problematic
under the theory unless, for example, it falls within and dominates
a single political jurisdiction. Furthermore, religious clumping
within a political jurisdiction is not facially problematic if the ju-
risdiction as a whole is religiously diverse. 9' The theory is con-
cerned with monolithic local democracies, not neighborhoods lack-
ing governmental authority.192 Second, the principle does not entail
opposition to religion in politics. One can object to the coincidence
of government institutions and uniform beliefs about religion with-
out fearing the effects of religiosity on politics.'93 In fact, anti-
sorting is compatible with support for religious argument within
democratic institutions. Yet it does imply qualms about organized
" What constitutes acceptable or optimal religious diversity is an enormous question
for anti-sorting proponents. See note 202; Part III.C.
192 Insofar as a "neighborhood" is a unit of local government under relevant law, anti-
sorting theories apply with similar force. As for families, presumably they would be dis-
tinguished on the same public/private line that differentiates religions themselves, or by
rights of intimate association and child-rearing. See, e.g., Roberts v United States Jaycees,
468 US 609, 618-19 (1984); Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925).
93 Accord McDaniel v Paty, 435 US 618 (1978) (invalidating a ministerial exception).
Contrast, for example, Vincent Blasi, Vouchers and Steering, 18 J L & Pol 607, 613 (2002)
("[R]eligion remains a distinctively dangerous political force."), Abner S. Greene, The
Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 Yale L J 1611, 1614 (1993), and Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U Chi L Rev 195, 197 (1992).
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religious factions, which ought to be accounted for by institutional
choice and design.
A preference for mixing cannot achieve universal support, of
course. Religious separatists dedicated to avoiding communities of
sin, secularists convinced that religion is an infectious fraud, and
still others will not be satisfied. Anti-sorting principles cannot be
any more neutral than, say, basic commitments to liberal democ-
racy. 94 But unmitigated tolerance seems inconceivable for a func-
tioning nation, and anti-sorting is consistent with a liberal goal of
relative inclusion.
B. APPLICATIONS
If an anti-sorting principle is rightly planted in constitutional
law, what form should it take in live controversies? Facets of the
question track the debates about segregation by race. 95 Should
the Constitution be invoked only to prevent or remedy de jure
state action that separates people or encourages them to separate
among political subdivisions, or also to more affirmatively strive
for integration as a matter of social fact? Or is religion-blindness
the appropriate norm, such that conscious official efforts to in-
tegrate are forbidden by the Constitution? Before presenting a
critique of anti-sorting principles, this section explores the op-
tions. It demonstrates that the idea, however controversial, can do
lots of work.
1. Versions. Because the concern is political boundaries aligning
with religious divisions, and assuming state and local governments
retain significant authority and that their political community is
importantly defined by physical territory, then there are two tar-
gets for anti-sorting principles: (1) the geographic distribution of
people and (2) the physical location of political borders. Anti-
sorting principles might affect either one, but parts of both targets
are practically immobile. First, people have already sorted them-
selves to some degree and, although the U.S. population is fairly
transient today, not everyone is interested in a change of scenery.
Second, changing political boundaries is disruptive, administra-
194See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 199-200 (1996) (discussing education
requirements).
'9' See generally David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U
Chi L Rev 935, 949 (1989); Greene, 96 Colum L Rev at 28-29 (cited in note 13) (anal-
ogizing racial segregation).
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tively and conceptually. It is theoretically possible intermittently
to redraw municipal boundaries, as we do legislative districts, and
local government lines already change through state-law mecha-
nisms of incorporation and annexation. But the Constitution's text
addresses boundary adjustments to one state that involve the ter-
ritory of another state; 96 almost any boundary change is costly as
people adjust to a new polity and territorial unit; and some bound-
aries are so conceptually hardened that they are not going any-
where in the near term.
In the same spirit, certain extreme anti-sorting norms can be
ruled out. The Constitution will not be read to mandate, and no
court will order, the forced relocation of people to achieve an
equal distribution by religion across municipalities. Compelled
displacement for reasons related to religion is a liberty and prop-
erty intrusion conceivable for settlers in Gaza but not for residents
of the United States today; and equal distribution, even with an
adequate measure, is just a bad idea in no way dictated by con-
stitutional logic. Geographic quotas for every religious denomi-
nation and secular theory would be almost impossible to admin-
ister and normatively wrongheaded. Harmless or innovative sects
with small memberships might not survive as their numbers are
spread thin throughout a state or the nation. This is particularly
true in the United States, where there are almost countless reli-
gions, from Druid to nondenominational Christian to Foursquare
Gospel.'9 7 And there is good reason to accept diverse versions of
diverse localities. 98
But anti-sorting law can be equally uncontroversial. At a min-
imum, subnational political boundaries could not be drawn by
government officials to separate religious sects and/or the non-
religious against their will. The same can be said for coercive
relocation of people to maintain separation across political bound-
aries. Both would be pure forms of mandatory segregation. They
produce the threats associated with religious sorting without cap-
196 See US Const, Art IV, § 3, cl 1 ("[Not] any State [shall] be formed by . . . Parts of
States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the
Congress."); cf. United States v Louisiana, 363 US 1, 35 (1960) (indicating congressional
control over state boundaries, at least at the point of admission to the Union).
See ARIS Survey at 10, 12-13 (cited in note 22) (relying on self-identification).
1 See Part III.C.
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turing the upside of unregulated private choice.19 9 Neither Karst
nor Tiebout would be pleased. We might imagine two or more
groups intensely opposed to each other's religious values, verging
on violence and seeking each other's elimination, yet committed
to ongoing confrontation within the same local political institu-
tion. At that point, government might produce adequately com-
pelling reasons for separation. Otherwise, it is safe to assume that
a plausible anti-sorting principle bars government officials from
either drawing political boundaries or moving people to ensure
religious segregation against (or regardless of) private party
wishes. At the least, the principle reaches officials pushing people
apart on religious criteria without compelling reason.
The short logical extension is to state action beyond forced
relocation or strategic boundary drawing, but which serves the
same function. A useful analogy is to certain race-based equal
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. For facially
race-neutral state action, the generic test requires more than dis-
parate impact on a minority group; it demands discriminatory
purpose."' For religion at least, the issue is not only minority
subordination but also other risks posed by homogeneity like
group polarization, conformity, cascades, and the threat to non-
establishment and free-exercise norms. So the ideas of disparate
impact and discrimination can be supplemented with a concern
for religious separation per se, as long as it takes place across
political boundaries. A fairly minimal anti-sorting principle could
therefore prohibit government action that is both (1) done for the
purpose" 1 of achieving religious homogeneity20 2 within a political
... See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Viii. Scb. Dist. v Grumet, 512 US 687, 690 (1994)
(invalidating special legislation creating a school district at the request of a religious sect);
cf. Gomillian v Lightfoot, 364 US 339, 341 (1960) (refusing to dismiss a challenge to new
municipal boundaries that excluded almost all African-American voters who were part of
the old jurisdiction).
200 See Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 US 252, 265
(1977).
20 A satisfying test for official purpose is hard to find, particularly as applied to collec-
tives. But we are not limited to direct inquiries into historical fact. Purpose can be checked
by post hoc justifications and their fit with observable state action. See Republican Party
of Minn. v White, 536 US 765, 779-80 (2002); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v
United States, 527 US 173, 187 (1999) (distinguishing asserted government interests from
enacted legislative policy).
202 This is a key clause for anti-sorting proponents to define and I do not offer a precise
formula here. An indisputable example is a plan to achieve 100 percent adherence to a
single church by 100 percent of the polity. But dangers of sorting will arise before then.
Republic, Missouri's, vision of a Christian city seems sufficiently exclusionary, for example.
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jurisdiction2" and (2) does or is likely to either (a) cause greater
religious homogeneity within that jurisdiction or (b) prevent re-
duction of such homogeneity-at least without a compelling jus-
tification.
This kind of "hold harmless" orientation is inelegant yet rela-
tively manageable. It resists all calculated state action that risks
pushing people in the direction of religious homogeneity. Once a
court detects a purpose incompatible with any anti-sorting prin-
ciple-achieving a religiously uniform citizenry through sorting-
then the challenged state action cannot be carried out if it threat-
ens to move the population toward that goal. Furthermore, a va-
riety of conduct could violate the rule. It is not restricted to the
construction of political boundaries or the physical relocation of
people. On the other hand, the test does not make courts re-
sponsible for halting privately instigated religious sorting. It de-
mands problematic government objectives, it is keyed to officials
promoting a religious demography potentially at odds with dis-
aggregated private choice, and it concentrates on homogeneity
within a polity rather than trying to pick a version of "adequate
religious diversity."2 °4 Assuming a homogenous status quo, then,
the town of Liberal, Missouri, could not use government resources
to provide free land or down payments on houses for atheists alone.
In this vein, it is worth noting the many statistical measures of "segregation." See Douglas
S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, The Dimensions of Residential Segregation, 67 Social Forces
281, 282-83 (1988) (grouping 20 indices into categories of evenness, exposure, concen-
tration, centralization, and clustering). "Evenness" is a candidate for anti-sorting purposes;
it measures distribution of a given group's population across geographic subunits. See id
at 283-84, 308 (recommending the dissimilarity index). Roughly speaking, the dissimilarity
index is the proportion of a particular subpopulation that would have to move from their
current subunit(s) to other(s) in order for each subunit to have the same percentage of
that subpopulation. See Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid:
Segregation and the Making of the Underclass 20 (1993); Karl E. Taeuber and Alma E Taeuber,
Negroes in Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change 203-04 (1965). Evenness
is not a very good measure of political power, however. A faith can be perfectly spread
throughout all subunits and be a powerless minority, an ineffectual majority, or a com-
manding monolith in every one.
203 The suggested test would not look for system-wide effects from state-encouraged
sorting. This limit is intended as a sacrifice of ideal form in return for a test courts can
more easily operate.
204 Compare Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 Harv L Rev
593, 627 (2002) (distinguishing the optimal number of firms in a competitive market from
the identification of anticompetitive behavior); Richard H. Pildes, A Theory of Political
Competition, 85 Va L Rev 1605, 1612 (1999) ("In theory and in doctrine, we can often
identify what is troublingly unfair, unequal, or wrong without a precise standard of what
is optimally fair, equal, or right.").
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Nor could Republic, Missouri, do the same for members of the
Southern Baptist Convention.
Another type of state action is not so purposeful or assertive
yet it facilitates religious sorting. Illustrations are facially neutral
procedures for incorporating new municipalities and state efforts
to make publicly available accurate demographic data, including
religious affiliation. Such action might be taken without any pur-
pose that sorting will be increased or maintained. At this point,
committed integrationists and Tiebout enthusiasts begin rapidly
to diverge. The former will remain dedicated to preventing sep-
aration, regardless of official motives. As an analogy, some state
action has been condemned for encouraging or facilitating racism
or racial separation. The classic example is Shelley v Kraemer."'
Case law under the Fair Housing Act might be an even better
model, since it directly regulates communication.2 "6 Some courts
bar real estate advertisers from consciously picturing people of
only one race,2°7 or real estate agents from supplying information
on racial demographics." 8 Such propositions could be exported to
the religion context-the Act probably should be read to treat race
and religion similarly, anyway-and then enforced as constitu-
tional law against state action not expressly speaking to real estate
transactions.0 9 Under this version of the anti-sorting principle,
205 334 US 1 (1948); cf. Norwood v Harrison, 413 US 455, 466-67 (1973) (involving state
aid to segregated schools); Reitman vMulkey, 387 US 369, 381 (1967) (involving an attempt
to entrench the absence of antidiscrimination laws).
206 42 USC § 3604(c) (making it unlawful to "publish . . . any notice, statement, or
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status,
or national origin").
207 See Ragin v New York Times Co., 923 F2d 995, 1001-02 (2nd Cir) (affirming the
denial of a publisher's motion to dismiss), cert denied, 502 US 821 (1991).
200 See 42 USC § 3604(a), (b), & (d); 24 CFR § 100.70. There is disagreement over
what constitutes unlawful "steering," however. Compare Village of Bellwood v Dwivedi, 895
F2d 1521, 1530-31 (7th Cir 1990) (demanding disparate treatment of customers because
of race to make out a racial steering claim, such that accurately responding to customer
requests about racial demographics apparently would not violate the Act) and Leadership
Council for Metro. Open Communities, Inc. v Rossi Realty, Inc., No 98 C 7852, 2001 WL
289870, at *5 (ND Ill 2001) (unpublished) (granting summary judgment for defendants
on a religious-steering claim under the rule of Dwivedi), with Heights Community Congress
v Hilltop Realty Inc., 774 F2d 135, 140 (6th Cir 1985) (condemning conduct with the intent
and effect of "steering," and suggesting that the Act can be violated by "truthful infor-
mational statements with racial content" or "failure to show homes in a particular location
absent a specific request"), cert denied, 475 US 1019 (1986).
209 There is no strong reason to think that rules first authored or suggested by Congress
are unavailable for use by courts as constitutional law. In some instances Congress might
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and without an anti-subordination override of some variety, cre-
ating the Village of Kiryas Joel was constitutionally forbidden.
Similarly, Congress's refusal to admit the Mormon-designed State
of Deseret in the mid-1800s 210 was constitutionally compelled.
This certainly would be an aggressive constitutional rule. But re-
call that some Establishment Clause precedent, including the en-
dorsement test, polices both government purpose and effect.
A difficult issue is then the official promotion of a jurisdiction
as a haven for a particular denomination. This conduct might be
painted as either an improper government effort to shape dem-
ographics or a justifiable provision of accurate information. Strong
integrationists cannot accept such facilitation of sorting but Tie-
bout followers certainly might. Promotion of community character
could be a municipal service that the model suggests people should
sort over-a public good hindered by collective action problems,
at least in localities filled with unorganized secularists or nonde-
nominational Christians. For some uses of religious messages, the
disagreement can be overcome. An official purpose to alter reli-
gious sorting patterns in a particular direction without residents'
consent seems problematic, and officials might select crude or
otherwise misleading messages for just that reason.2 1' Moving con-
stitutional law much further, however, depends on a choice be-
tween fundamental commitments.
Some of these outcomes might be implausible, but there are
even bolder strokes to be considered. One is whether governments
may or must take affirmative action to create or maintain some
kind of religious diversity-through promotional efforts or other-
wise. 12 Similar issues have been difficult to settle in the race con-
text, and Justice Kennedy has suggested that the government has
be the first institution to articulate a rule that comports with a sound elaboration of the
Constitution, but that does not mean that those rules cannot be mimicked or built on in
court doctrine.
20 See Dale L. Morgan, The State of Deseret 2-3, 9 (1987).
211 But cf. Meese v Keene, 481 US 465, 467-69, 478-85 (1987) (rejecting a Speech Clause
challenge to the federal government labeling certain foreign films "political propaganda,"
at least without evidence that the public was actually influenced or misled).
212 Compare Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United
States 138-55 (1985) (describing a trend roughly opposite: the rise of incorporation for
suburban municipalities and the decline of annexation and consolidation for many large,
older, central cities); Ankur J. Goel, Maintaining Integration Against Minority Interests: An
Anti-Subjugation Theory for Equality in Housing, 22 Urban Law 369 (1990) (critically re-
viewing racial integration-maintenance measures, including ceiling quotas on minorities,
steering, and equity insurance).
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a constitutional obligation to be religion-blind when choosing po-
litical boundaries. In his Kiryas Joel concurrence he flatly stated,
"government may not use religion as a criterion to draw political
or electoral lines," '213 although he also referenced religious seg-
regation as the problem at hand.2 14 But if the constitutional ob-
jective is preventing the social fact of religious segregation, then
"diversity" efforts should be either presumptively valid or consti-
tutionally mandated. This ambitious goal might not otherwise be
achieved.
2. Implications. Legislative and executive action are not the only
government influences on religious sorting. Court decisions also
can play a role. An anti-sorting principle should prompt judiciaries
to think about the consequences of their constitutional decisions
for religious clumping across political boundaries. This might not
entail massive doctrinal revision, but it would slant judicial choices
in at least three ways.
First, a premium would be placed on uniformity in the treatment
of religion by government across jurisdictions, to avoid incentives to
sort. It follows that national decision making on issues of religious
freedom would be preferred to local decision making. The former
increases the likelihood that many religious and secular values are
incorporated into the process for generating a national rule.215 In fact,
this preference for centralized solutions is not a departure from cur-
rent judicial practice. Last Term was an excellent illustration. At the
same time the Justices divided over state and local Ten Command-
ments displays, they voted unanimously to reject an Establishment
Clause challenge to a federal statute that required religious accom-
modations for prison inmates.2 6 The next most recent unanimous
decision involving the Establishment Clause was nearly twenty years
ago-and it likewise upheld a federal legislative accommodation.2 7
213 Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Viii. Sch. Dist. v Grumet, 512 US 687, 728 (1994) (Kennedy,
J, concurring).
214 See id; cf. United States v Hays, 515 US 737, 739, 744-46 (1995) ("We have never
held that the racial composition of a particular voting district, without more, can violate
the Constitution.").
215 Not to say that the mix at the federal level is all-inclusive. Some sects may be without
political leverage. This concern can be addressed, however, with a sect-neutrality principle.
Accommodations for any religion or comparable secular interest would have to reach all
"religions."
2 16 See Cutter v Wilkinson, 125 S Ct 2113, 2117-18 (2005).
217 See Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v Amos,
483 US 327, 329-30 (1987).
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On the other hand, invalidation of the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act as applied to state and local action in City of Boerne v
Flores218 looks inconsistent with a strong anti-sorting principle. The
Act provided a uniform standard for mandatory government ac-
commodation of religion.219 The Court's preferred test set out in
Employment Division v Smith,22 ° which nearly forecloses required
accommodation,22 might appear equally uniform. But the upshot
of Smith empowered state politics to grant or withhold dispensations
from secular burdens.22 Likewise is Locke v Davey, 2 3 which per-
mitted the State of Washington to exclude devotional theology ma-
jors from a college scholarship program. Each of these decisions
would be suspect at best. They open the possibility of substantial
policy diversity across jurisdictions on the sensitive issue of religious
accommodations, and therefore create incentives for religious sort-
ing. It is possible, of course, that every jurisdiction will provide the
same set of accommodations as they compete for religious residents.
But this is quite improbable given variable local preferences. In this
regard, the tension between the Court's pre-Smith Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause decisions on religious exemptions224 no
longer seems so bad. No one wants doctrine that simultaneously
requires and forbids the same religious exemption. But narrowing
the area of political discretion over exemptions should diminish
incentives to sort. 25
Second, a strong anti-sorting principle has a substantive bias be-
yond uniformity. More specifically, a liberty-based conception of re-
ligious freedom might be preferred to equality-based notions. The
former is sensitive to government-imposed burdens on religion re-
gardless of how the state treats anyone else. Outcomes do not nec-
21 521 US 507 (1997).
219 42 USC § 2000bb-l(a)-(b) (prohibiting government from substantially burdening
religious exercise unless it demonstrates that the burden serves a compelling governmental
interest by the least restrictive means).
220 494 US 872 (1990).
221 See id at 879; Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law, 98 Nw
U L Rev 1291, 1336-37 n 238 (2004) (listing Smith's possible limits).
222 See Smith, 494 US at 890.
223 540 US 712 (2004).
224 See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Lee v Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 Supreme Court Review
123.
225 Perhaps Congress rather than the Supreme Court should be setting national rules
for religious exemptions. But an anti-sorting theory probably has little to say about that
institutional choice.
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essarily depend on whether religion is being singled out, or whether
a comparable group is receiving favorable treatment. An equality-
based conception is pegged to just such facts. This means that
successful claims are contingent on the features of a particular legal
regime. That is unfortunate from the anti-sorting perspective. Var-
iance should be minimized, even if it cannot be eliminated over a
series of applications.
Thus the outcomes might be the same in cases like Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v City of Hialeah226-striking down local ordi-
nances that singled out certain types of religiously motivated animal
sacrifice" 7-and Tenafly Eruv Association v Borough of Tenafly228 -
holding that a municipality likely violated the Free Exercise Clause
by prohibiting use of utility poles to demarcate an eruv."9 But the
rationales would be rewritten to stress the burden on religious prac-
tice from the challenged regulation, instead of intentionally dis-
parate government treatment compared to some other conduct. A
similar objection might be lodged against some federal statutes.
Legislation akin to the Equal Access Act of 1984230 might become
problematic, although that particular statute's broad base of pro-
tected activities does relieve sorting fears, and the central source of
decision making should be comforting.
Third, an anti-sorting orientation might define "religion." This is
a notoriously difficult issue, 2 1 but guidance is provided by the ob-
jective. The problem with which anti-sorting is concerned involves
uniformity of values or worldview. This is the condition that ar-
guably produces threats of group polarization, monitoring diffi-
culties, risks of government-facilitated proselytizing or ostracism.
Accordingly, the anti-sorting principle suggests definitions of re-
ligion focusing on a shared belief system about good and evil, the
purpose and origins of life, the relationship of human beings to a
226 508 US 520 (1993).
227 See id at 524.
228 309 F3d 144 (3d Cir 2002), cert denied, 539 US 942 (2003).
229 See id at 167-68 (relying on lack of executive enforcement against similar conduct).
2'020 USC § 4071(a)-(b) (prohibiting public secondary schools that receive federal
funding and that choose to create a "limited open forum" from denying student access to
the forum on the basis of the "religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the
speech at such meetings"); Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs v Mergens, 496 US
226, 253 (1990) (rejecting a facial challenge to the Act under the Establishment Clause).
23 For helpful analysis, see Choper, Securing Religious Liberty at 64-86 (cited in note
60); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-6 (2d ed 1988); and Kent Green-
await, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 Cal L Rev 753 (1984).
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higher power, and so forth. For anti-sorting claims, the concept of
religion would come close to Paul Tillich's description of "ultimate
concern" 232 and "deeply held" belief systems that guide human con-
duct, which were the target of Vietnam era conscientious objector
cases. 23 3 Second, an organization and an interactive community also
seem relevant-the types of features stressed by Wisconsin v Yoder, 234
albeit in a case of near-complete exit. But longevity, rituals, belief
in a personified god or gods, and written scripture would be far
less important in and of themselves. This time, a broad belief-
oriented concept of religion would not be used to liberate individ-
uals from secular power, but the concept nevertheless fits the as-
pirations of anti-sorting.
C. RESERVATIONS
Having pushed the anti-sorting idea about as far as it might go,
we should conclude with some hardheaded skepticism. The last
implication regarding the definition of religion is a useful starting
point. It suggests monumental difficulties with strong versions of
an anti-sorting principle, at least when enforced by courts as con-
stitutional law. Once elaborated, the principle becomes hard to
confine to "religion"; and if it is so confined, the principle will
disadvantage co-religionists seeking political power through sort-
ing. More concretely, if shared ideology is basically what makes
religious homogeneity within political communities problematic,
then conventional definitions of religion do not capture the threat.
They are underinclusive. Geographic separation by partisan affil-
iation, for example, could produce the same dynamic. 235 We might
distinguish religious groups by their average commitment, co-
hesion, and unwillingness to compromise.236 But surely that char-
acterization is a crude one. Conventional notions of religion are
232 Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith 1-12 (1957).
233 Welsh v United States, 398 US 333, 344 (1970) (exempting "those whose consciences,
spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or
peace"); id at 344-45 (Harlan, J, concurring); see United States v Seeger, 380 US 163,
180-83 (1965).
234 406 US 205, 216 (1972) (distinguishing the Amish and their "deep religious convic-
tion, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living").
23. Compare Vieth v Jbelierer, 124 S Ct 1769, 1799 (2004) (Kennedy, J, concurring)
(refusing, at least for the time being, to impose federal constitutional restraints on partisan
gerrymandering).
236 See note 176 and accompanying text.
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also overinclusive for anti-sorting purposes. It is not clear that a
monolithic community of, for example, nondenominational Chris-
tians presents the same risks of group polarization, lack of dissent,
cascades, government proselytizing, and so on.
A lawyer's response-that religion must be treated differently
because of constitutional text-is probably unavailable. It is not
as if judicial suspicion of local action regarding religion was ever
firmly guided by textualism. The judiciary certainly could have
done a better job defending its application of non-establishment
norms through the Fourteenth Amendment. Anyway, to be log-
ically satisfying, anti-sorting principles might have to expand be-
yond religious separation, unless religion can be meaningfully dis-
tinguished in this context from other group characteristics. An
argument, grounded in empirical fact, is needed to contrast reli-
gion from partisanship, race, gender, age, class, national origin,
sexual orientation, and other concepts on which individuals might
sort themselves. We can start by emphasizing shared values and
organization, but that is just a beginning.
If religion is special, there are other powerful objections to
strong anti-sorting principles. Normative complaints have been
touched on above. We should not want a perfect distribution of
religious and secular affiliates, even if we could get it. Particularly
for groups posing no law-enforcement concerns and habitually
losing political battles, a separate local government might do them
and society much good.2 37 Some social experiments require uni-
formity of purpose before they can be evaluated; and allowing
them to play out reflects a healthy skepticism about perfection in
mainstream culture.23 Better that not every state and municipality
end up like the Federal Election Commission: balanced and feck-
less.
A price of religious integration, furthermore, can be minority
humiliation and unwanted assimilation.239 At least sometimes, sep-
237 Compare Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 Harv L Rev 1099 (2005)
(drawing from scholarship in local government law and using juries and districting as
examples); Ankur J. Goel et al., Comment, Black Neighborhoods Becoming Black Cities: Group
Empowerment, Local Control, and the Implications of Being Darker Than Brown, 24 Harv CR-
CL L Rev 415 (1988) (describing efforts to secede and incorporate East Palo Alto and
Mandela as separate municipalities, and defending such a strategy for disadvantaged racial
minorities).
238 Accord Greene, 96 Colum L Rev at 8 (cited in note 13).
23 Compare Board of Educ. of Khiyas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v Grumet, 512 US 687, 692
HeinOnline  -- 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 187 2005
188 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
aration defuses enough social friction to make up for losses in
empathy, learning, and the hope for intergroup cooperation. As
well, religiosity seems to correlate with desperate conditions. Of-
ten religion thrives where people are at the brink of elimination.24 °
Breaking up co-religionists into separate local democracies could
dissipate solidarity that is useful for overcoming existential chal-
lenges. Perhaps there is no constitutional right to associate within
a preferred government institution; but threats to disadvantaged
communities ought to check any impulse favoring ambitious ver-
sions of an anti-sorting principle. In addition, religion has the
potential of softening other problematic social divisions, like race.
There is a long history of racial homogeneity in many U.S.
churches,241 but not all.242 And there is always the draw of Tiebout,
aggregated private choice, and interlocal competition.
Speaking of "diversity" raises a conceptual problem for an am-
bitious principle. What does it mean for a local political com-
munity to be sufficiently diverse when there are hundreds of rec-
ognized religions? "One of each" is not possible in a nation so
vast without killing off countless sects.243 The hard job, therefore,
would be to articulate a minimum requirement for religious di-
versity within all or some types of local government. 24 Which
religious "minorities" are substitutes for others? Should the law
prioritize mainline mixing with the least powerful denominations,
following a kind of anti-subordination value? Should it prize in-
tegration of denominations most in need of reconciliation, on the
theory that social contact diminishes animosity? There are answers
to these questions but it is tough to find them in conventional
(1994) (recounting social troubles of disabled Satmar children in the existing public
schools).
240 See Norris and Inglehart, The Sacred and the Secular at 240-41 (cited in note 182).
241 See Kevin D. Dougherty, How Monochromatic Is Church Membership? Racial-Ethnic
Diversity in Religious Community, 64 Soc of Relig 65, 74 (2003) (scoring a sample of
congregations with the entropy index and noting that 42.9 percent were 100 percent
racially homogenous).
242 See ARIS Survey at 35 (cited in note 22) (exhibit 13); Howard Elinson, The Implications
of Pentecostal Religion for Intellectualism, Politics, and Race Relations, 70 Am J Soc 403, 406,
414-15 & n 34 (1965); see also John Burdick, What Is the Color of the Holy Spirit? Pen-
tecostalism and Black Identity in Brazil, 109 Latin Am Res Rev 109, 124 (1999).
243 See also Michael Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl, Jewish Law, andJewish Values, 13 South-
eastern Envt'l L J 1, 23 (2004) (arguing that "sprawl is to some extent a Jewish issue").
244 For an attempt to define a "racially balanced" public school, see Comfort v Lynn Sch.
Comm., 418 F3d 1, 6-9 & n 4 (1st Cir 2005) (en banc) (describing and upholding a local
policy regulating the interschool transfer of pupils).
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constitutional sources. It is far easier to identify religious ho-
mogeneity than to agree on the appropriate concept for diversity.
A softer cautionary note arises from uncertainty about the extent
of religious sorting in America. Empirical data on religious seg-
regation are less reliable and precise than is standard for other
divisions like race and income. True, and as noted above, a trend-
line of intercounty segregation scores can be calculated for reli-
gion.24 On the other hand, county-level numbers are probably
too general and there are weaknesses in the underlying data.246 At
least we can say that religiously homogenous counties are reason
for integrationist worries, understanding that numbers alone will
not depict political influence.
A related uncertainty is more important. Assuming there are
troubling levels of religious separation-and that current sepa-
ration is not so entrenched as to be irremediable-we lack a firm
understanding of the mechanisms for religious sorting.247 Why and
how deeply do people prefer to stick with fellow believers in a
state or municipal setting? It is not difficult to imagine that many
people feel most comfortable, or are only comfortable, when their
values and morality are reflected in those around them. This is
true for denominations like the Old Order Amish and many Or-
thodox Jews. Yet we also know that people choose living, work,
and recreational places for several reasons. Surveys indicate that
residential location choices are often prompted by housing, family,
or employment needs that are not necessarily related to religion.248
245 See Rhode and Strumpf, 93 Am Econ Rev at 1671 (table 6) (cited in note 110).
246 See note 82 and accompanying text.
247 Compare Taeuber and Taeuber, Negroes in Cities at 28 (cited in note 202) (distin-
guishing processes from patterns of residential racial segregation). There are case studies
from which lessons might be drawn. See Gerald Gamm, Urban Exodus: Why the Jews Left
Boston and the Catholics Stayed 15-24 & n 10 (1999) (claiming that Jewish and Protestant
congregations tend to be less territory-oriented than Catholic parishes, at least before
Vatican I).
24 See U.S. Census Bureau, American Housing Survey for the United States (2003) (table
2-11) (displaying results of survey questions on reasons/the main reason for choosing
present neighborhood; reporting significant numbers under "looks/design" and "other");
U.S. Census Bureau, Why People Move: Exploring the March 2000 Current Population Survey
2 (2001).
The relative paucity of data on religious sorting in the United States might reflect
relative calm among religions and secularists. Contrast research in countries with recent
histories of serious interfaith battles, like Israel and Northern Ireland. See, e.g., A. S.
Adair et al., The Local Housing System in Craigavon, N. Ireland: Etbno-religious Residential
Segregation, Socio-tenurial Polarisation and Sub-markets, 37 Urban Studies 1079 (2000); John
McPeake, Religion and Residential Search Behaviour in the Belfast Urban Area, 13 Housing
HeinOnline  -- 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 189 2005
190 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Religious demographics might play a role within the set of choices
bounded by other necessities; but there seems to be no good for-
mula for now. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that race
and income are, on the whole, more powerful drivers of jurisdic-
tional separation. Unlike religious heterogeneity scores, racial and
income heterogeneity recently have been connected to the number
of municipalities within U.S. counties. 49 On a related note, it is
likely that some religious sorting is an artifact of other social
divisions. Perhaps much religious separation is a consequence of
racial separation. If so, attacking the former would not relieve
sorting pressures generated by the latter.
Furthermore, it is not clear that tipping models for neighbor-
hood changes in racial composition25 ° work the same way for re-
ligion. Again, religion is less visible than race; and it might well
be that fewer Americans feel strongly about the addition of new
religions to their localities. Perhaps this bodes well for integration
efforts, but it also suggests that any preferences for religious ho-
mogeneity will often be overrun by other factors. To the extent
that the urge to sort religiously remains salient, we cannot be
certain of the degree to which state action is implicated. With
respect to government signaling, sometimes messages about dem-
ographics and power can be credibly delivered by private parties.2"'
Organized religious groups have, by definition, overcome collec-
tive action problems. Uncertainty about the system of religious
sorting in the United States today makes it hard to defend am-
bitious anti-sorting principles.
Studies 527 (1998); Itzhak Omer and Itzhak Benenson, Investigating Fine-Scale Residential
Segregation, by Means of Local Spatial Statistics, 12 Geographical Res F 41 (2002).
249 See Alesina et al, 112 J Pol Econ at 360-63, 387-91 (cited in note 189) (concentrating
on 1960 and 1990, using 17 Judeo-Christian groupings, and calculating "heterogeneity"
by the probability that two randomly selected residents will be members of the same
group). The authors did, however, find a statistically significant relationship between the
number of school attendance districts (in contrast to school districts) and religious het-
erogeneity at the county level, and which was stronger than that for such racial or income
heterogeneity. See id at 368 (reporting that a two-standard-deviation increase in religious
heterogeneity is associated with a 15 percent increase in school attendance areas).
20 See generally Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior 140-55 (1978);
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 Colum L Rev 1965
(2000).
25 After the Seventh Circuit barred a Ten Commandments monument from the lawn
in front of the Elkhart municipal building, see Books v City of Elkhart, 235 F3d 292, 295
(7th Cir 2000), cert denied, 532 US 1058 (2001), it was relocated to a plot owned by a
lumber company along the Riverwalk, see Indiana Ten Commandments Case Won't Be Re-
opened, AP, Aug 15, 2002.
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These reservations do not mean that an anti-sorting principle
is worthless or that courts should never intervene to prevent re-
ligious separation. Total judicial abstention and unyielding judicial
enforcement of aggressive anti-sorting rules are equally extrava-
gant positions. Yet current constitutional law has the advantage of
flexibility; anti-sorting ideas are present but not fully articulated.
We can therefore advocate small steps without disrupting settled
law. Despite the uncertainties, courts have strong reason to enforce
a rule along the lines of the one suggested above2 52-invalidating
government action if it is both designed and likely to help achieve
religious homogeneity within a political jurisdiction-at least ab-
sent a genuine purpose of accommodating a subordinated group
in accord with free-exercise values. Furthermore, a modest anti-
sorting principle should affect other constitutional doctrine
drafted by courts. In situations of reasonable doubt, the judiciary
should favor doctrine that is less likely to generate religious sorting
across political boundaries. Even these cautious moves are subject
to dispute, of course, for being too loose or too vague. But they
are defensible guidelines for courts. Going much further would
require knowledge and justification that we do not now have.
All of this indicates that the Supreme Court was correct to leave
the Texas monument alone and perhaps wrong to order removal
of the McCreary County display. Signaling a local religious char-
acter is within the concern of even modest anti-sorting principles.
But those versions of the principle have little apprehension for a
forty-year-old monument, sharing space with other sculpture on
state capitol grounds, identified by date and private donor. It is
hard to imagine this icon having much present effect on decisions
of outsiders to locate or visit in Austin or the State of Texas, and
the limited record provided no reason to believe that the politi-
cians who accepted the gift intended otherwise. The anti-prose-
lytism principle can complement anti-sorting arguments, but the
former has little traction in this setting. McCreary County's pro-
motional efforts are more troubling, but likely innocuous as a
constitutional matter without additional information. Placing a
Decalogue inside a building used for vehicle registration and trial
court business is a poor strategy for attracting or repelling tran-
sients. A high-profile external display would be far more vulnerable
22 See text accompanying notes 199-204.
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to anti-sorting arguments. 253 This does not imply that anti-sorting
principles will not invalidate state action that is likely to occur-
which might be an unhealthy requirement for constitutional doc-
trine in any event. Republic, Missouri, is not the only contem-




The endorsement test is, like the rest of the doctrine sur-
rounding religious establishments, primarily concerned with state
and local misbehavior. There are historical, structural, and the-
oretical reasons for this. But taking away majority-supported sym-
bols generates more resentment than one might anticipate. So it
makes sense to have a strong reason for doing it. Anti-prosely-
tism-preventing state power from joining or overrunning reli-
gious missions to inculcate citizens-is a defensible constitutional
objective. However, this problem is not strongly implicated by
many public religious messages. And supporters of the anti-pros-
elytism principle seem to take community membership as un-
realistically static. Adding an anti-sorting principle-which would
cover state and local governments influencing their demographics
by the strategic deployment of religious symbols-provides needed
heft to the non-endorsement idea. Equally important, the principle
understands political community membership as dynamic and
shaped by state action.
At the same time, humility is in order. We do not know all that
we reasonably might about the system of religious sorting in Amer-
ica. In addition, strong anti-sorting rules are understandably con-
troversial. Nobody should want an even distribution of every iden-
tifiable denomination and secular philosophy across every political
jurisdiction. A defensible measure of "religious diversity," more-
over, is not readily available. Nor will the work done on race
smoothly carry over into the religion context, where the historical,
sociological, and normative differences fall somewhere between
"' It is possible that a relatively poor area like McCreary meant to boost local loyalty
to the County by reflecting community values as a way of retaining population. But without
more evidence, this is speculation.
254 See notes 89-95 and accompanying text (collecting examples that might constitute
unconstitutional government encouragement of religious sorting by political jurisdiction,
all of which took place during the development of the endorsement test).
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significant and massive. Tempered measures are best, especially
with respect to constitutional law enforced by courts. For now the
judicial focus ought to be on religious homogeneity within political
jurisdictions, official action that consciously and effectively pro-
motes or entrenches such sorting, and the sorting risks that ac-
company other doctrinal choices. Doing this much would be rel-
atively unambitious yet meaningful.
Whatever are the appropriate doctrinal implications, an anti-
sorting perspective focuses on questions that matter. It pinpoints
live social phenomena in a modern, dynamic, and religiously di-
verse nation. This should be a welcome addition to our continuing
search for the proper relationship between religion and political
institutions. If remixing the Supreme Court's composition helps
us revisit this relationship, then the endorsement test's inevitable
retirement is also a hopeful beginning.
HeinOnline  -- 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 193 2005
HeinOnline  -- 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 194 2005
